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ABSTRACT—Directors wield increasing influence in corporate America, 
making pivotal decisions regarding corporate affairs and management. A 
robust literature recognizes directors’ important role and examines their 
incentives and performance. In particular, scholars have worried that “busy 
directors”—those who serve on multiple corporate boards—may face time 
constraints that affect their performance. Little attention, however, has been 
paid to directors who sit on the boards of multiple companies within the same 
industry. This Article terms them “horizontal directors” and spotlights, for 
the first time, the legal and policy issues they raise. The “horizontal” feature 
of directorships, a term often used in the antitrust context, could stifle 
competition and effectively consolidate industries, yet risks being 
overlooked by scholars, practitioners, and regulators alike. 
 This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it is the first 
to empirically identify the phenomenon of horizontal directors. It does so 
through an original dataset that reveals the staggering number of directors 
who serve on the boards of two or more companies operating within the same 
industry. Second, the Article uses the context of horizontal directors to 
illuminate the push and pull between the priorities of corporate governance 
and antitrust law. Horizontal directorships simultaneously raise antitrust 
concerns regarding collusion and coordination, which could stifle 
competition, while also serving the goals of corporate governance by 
maximizing shareholder value. This Article bridges the corporate 
governance and antitrust literatures, offering a set of potential reforms to 
address horizontal directorships. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, after nine years of service, Eric Meurice left his position as the 
President and Chief Executive Officer of ASML, a provider of 
semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technology.1 He then did what 
 
 1 Matt Steinglass, ASML Chief Steps Down as Revenue Drops, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013), 
https://www.ft.com/content/5790956e-a733-11e2-bfcd-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/89P9-JF9W]; 
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many other retired CEOs do: he joined several other corporations’ boards as 
an independent director. In 2014, Meurice joined IPG Photonics’ and NXP 
Semiconductors N.V.’s boards,2 and in 2015, he was also elected to 
UMICORE’s board of directors specifically to fill an independent director 
position on the board.3 Meurice is a “busy director,” a term given to directors 
who simultaneously serve on boards of multiple corporations.4 
Meurice is joined by many others. For example, James L. Dolan 
currently serves as the Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 
the Madison Square Garden Company in addition to his Executive Chairman 
position at MSG Networks and his director position at AMC Networks.5 In 
addition, Dolan previously served as a director at Cablevision from 1991 to 
2016.6 
The impact that busy directors like Meurice and Dolan may have on 
corporate performance and corporate governance has been a hot topic of 
debate in current academic literature and in public discourse.7 By assuming 
 
Press Release, SOITEC Announces Changes to Board of Directors, GLOBE NEWSWIRE (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/03/28/1780999/0/en/SOITEC-SOITEC-
ANNOUNCES-CHANGES-TO-BOARD-OF-DIRECTORS.html [https://perma.cc/RQL2-YYN9]. 
 2 Board of Directors, IPG, http://investor.ipgphotonics.com/corporate-governance/board-of-
directors [https://perma.cc/WM6D-LXRJ]; Press Release, NXP Welcomes E. Meurice as New Non-
Executive Director, NXP (Mar. 28, 2014), https://investors.nxp.com/news-releases/news-release-
details/nxp-welcomes-e-meurice-new-non-executive-director [https://perma.cc/3DHJ-2QUN]. 
 3 Press Release, Notice of Ordinary Shareholders’ Meeting—Three Candidates Nominated to Join 
Umicore’s Board of Directors, UMICORE (Mar. 27, 2015), 
https://www.umicore.com/en/media/press/20150327AGMBoardNominationEN [https://perma.cc/8L6L-
FVUR]; Board of Directors, UMICORE, https://www.umicore.com/en/governance/board-of-directors/ 
[https://perma.cc/2H7W-EGY8] (noting that Meurice will be up for election again in 2021). 
 4 ISS, 2016 BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2016-americas-policy-updates.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BKZ-
M3JA] (summarizing academic research defining as “busy” a director who serves on three or more 
boards). This Article takes a broader view, defining “busy” to be more than one board. See infra note 59. 
 5 See The Madison Square Garden Company, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 23 (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1636519/000119312519274800/d800837ddef14a.htm#toc800
837_29 [https://perma.cc/9EE9-SU9K]. 
 6 Id. Dolan served on all four boards between 2015 and 2016. See id. 
 7 See, e.g., Bradley W. Benson et al., Do Busy Directors and CEOs Shirk Their Responsibilities? 
Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions, 55 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 1, 1 (2015); Joann S. Lublin, Three, 
Four, Five? How Many Board Seats Are Too Many?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/three-four-five-how-many-board-seats-are-too-many-1453342763 
[https://perma.cc/E6PM-QBYG]; Todd Wallack & Sacha Pfeiffer, Debate Swirls on How Many Board 
Directorships Are Enough, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 10, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/12/09/some-corporate-directors-overboard-joining-many-
boards-and-raising-performance-questions/pQBVAGZmCBJ4fzaKTGdziP/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6P75-U4XH]; Alexander Ljungqvist & Konrad Raff, Busy Directors: Strategic 
Interaction and Monitoring Synergies 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23889, 
2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23889.pdf [https://perma.cc/562D-SEBP]. 
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positions on multiple boards, busy directors are in a unique position to 
provide networking and knowledge benefits to the portfolio of companies in 
which they serve.8 Conversely, however, they may also be too busy to devote 
ample effort and time to each of their board positions, due to their 
commitments to other companies.9 
Meurice and Dolan, however, are more than just busy directors; they 
are also “horizontal directors.”10 Meurice and Dolan are both directors for 
multiple companies operating within the same industry. Meurice currently 
serves exclusively on boards in the semiconductor industry, and Dolan 
serves on boards in the cable industry. Analyzing this “horizontal” feature of 
their directorships, a term often used in the antitrust context,11 adds a new 
layer of complexity to the ways in which their busyness impacts the 
companies they serve. 
Horizontal directors, such as Meurice and Dolan, are significant 
because they stand at a unique intersection of antitrust law and corporate 
governance. Antitrust laws are meant to prevent competitors from colluding 
at the expense of consumers,12 while corporate governance is mostly focused 
on increasing shareholder welfare.13 Since shareholders and consumers are 
 
 8 See Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Outside Directors’ Protection, 46 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 129, 132–33 (2017) [hereinafter Barzuza & Curtis, Outside Directors’ Protection]; see also 
Christa H. S. Bouwman, Corporate Governance Propagation Through Overlapping Directors, 24 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 2358, 2358–59 (2011). 
 9 See Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 61 J. FIN. 689, 689 
(2006) [hereinafter Fich & Shivdasani, Busy Boards] (arguing that busy directors “are associated with 
weak corporate governance”). 
 10 The term “horizontal director” alludes to the antitrust concerns of connectedness between 
competitors. The term has been used in one prior academic article focused on the financial industry alone. 
See Tatjana Berg et al., Sharing a Director with a Peer 2 (Univ. of St. Gallen, Sch. Fin., Working Papers 
on Fin. No. 2015/07, 2015) (defining “horizontal directors” as “[d]irectors affiliated with firms within the 
same industry,” based on Standard Industry Classification codes). 
 11 The term “horizontal” is used in the antitrust context to describe mergers of companies that are on 
the same level of a supply chain, i.e., direct competitors with one another. See Anticompetitive Practices, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/anticompetitive-practices 
[https://perma.cc/8X4K-MF8A]. 
 12 John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, 
Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (“[T]he fundamental goal of antitrust 
law is to protect consumers.”). 
 13 See Lucian Arye Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
842 (2005) (“[E]ffective corporate governance . . . enhances shareholder and firm value . . . .”); Michael 
C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 235 (2002) (rectifying the debate between the value maximization proposition and the 
stakeholder theory, accepting that long-term value maximization is still shareholder value maximization 
and should be the goal of corporate governance); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business 
Is to Increase Its Profits 33, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970) (“In a free‐enterprise, private‐property 
system, a corporate executive is an employe[e] of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility 
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often at odds,14 horizontal directors strain this subtle distinction to its fullest. 
On the one hand, they may enable companies to coordinate or collude at the 
expense of consumers. Yet, the same coordination may actually benefit the 
shareholders of these companies, allowing them to increase profits by having 
consumers pay more, therefore helping company performance and 
improving shareholder value. 
While existing literature has dealt with the concept of “director 
interlocks”15 in various contexts, it has not focused on horizontal 
concentration.16 This lack of attention to the horizontal aspect of director 
 
to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, 
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”). 
 14 Some Americans hold shares directly in companies and many have retirement savings that are also 
invested in stocks through pension and mutual funds. Therefore, it may be argued that they are hedged 
against any costs they incur as consumers since they are also shareholders of the same companies from 
which they buy products. However, many Americans do not have any retirement savings and therefore 
are not hedged, bearing the entire cost of collusion as consumers. In fact, in 2018 one in five Americans 
had no retirement savings, and only half of households had anything invested in the stock market. See 
Patricia Cohen, We All Have a Stake in the Stock Market, Right? Guess Again, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/business/economy/stocks-economy.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y8FW-U6E9] (“Roughly half of all households don’t have a cent invested in stocks,” 
whether through retirement funds or otherwise); 1 in 3 Americans Have Less than $5,000 in Retirement 
Savings, NW. MUT. (May 8, 2018), https://news.northwesternmutual.com/2018-05-08-1-In-3-Americans-
Have-Less-Than-5-000-In-Retirement-Savings [https://perma.cc/2FJB-VUP3]. As of 2019, 22% have 
less than $5,000 in retirement savings and only 16% have $200,000 or more in retirement savings. Emmie 
Martin, Here’s How Much Americans Have Saved for Retirement, CNBC (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/26/how-much-americans-have-saved-for-retirement.html 
[https://perma.cc/2P5J-C9S4]. 
 15 The term “director interlocks” refers to the connection between the companies on whose boards 
the same director serves. See Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate 
Governance, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 669, 669–74 (2015) [hereinafter Barzuza & Curtis, Board Interlocks 
and Corporate Governance] (offering an analysis of interlocks’ effect on corporate governance); see also 
John Bizjak et al., Option Backdating and Board Interlocks, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4821, 4826 (2009); 
William K. Carroll & J.P. Sapinski, Corporate Elites and Intercorporate Networks, in THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 180 (John Scott & Peter J. Carrington eds., 2011). 
 16 With the exception of a few older studies that have looked at interlocking directors and collusion 
in the U.S., contemporary literature has not explored the horizontal aspect of directors’ interlocks. The 
older studies have similarly underexplored the industry-horizontal aspect of these directors. See 
JOHANNES M. PENNINGS, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 82–93 (1980) (discussing interlocking boards 
from a sociological perspective and arguing that they are unlikely to warrant antitrust intervention); 
Hubert Buch-Hansen, Interlocking Directorates and Collusion: An Empirical Analysis, 29 INT’L SOC. 
249 (2014) (providing a description of the literature in the U.S. and globally); Peter C. Dooley, The 
Interlocking Directorate, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 314 (1969) (examining interlocks among the 250 largest 
companies in the U.S. in 1965 but with limited regards to industry aspect); Kevin F. Hallock, Dual 
Agency: Corporate Boards with Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 55 (Jennifer Carpenter & David Yermack eds., 
1999) (examining reciprocal interlocks regardless of industry); Thomas Koenig et al., Models of the 
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interlocks is particularly surprising for two distinct reasons. First, existing 
antitrust regulation specifically prohibits directors from serving on the 
boards of two competitors.17 Sharing a director across companies in the same 
industry may therefore explicitly violate these laws—or at the very least the 
spirit behind them18—but this potential violation has long been ignored.19 
Second, antitrust law has reemerged in recent years, commanding 
increased attention to market concentration and consumer welfare.20 One 
layer of increased attention has revolved around the traditional question of 
market concentration in merger decisions.21 A second layer involves recent 
research into “horizontal shareholding”22 by institutional investors. This 
emerging literature has sparked a vivid academic and public debate regarding 
the effects of shareholder concentration on antitrust policy.23 Prominent 
 
Significance of Interlocking Corporate Directorates, 38 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 173 (1979) (examining 
replacement rate of interlocking directors but focusing on company size and not industry). 
 17 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 18 See, e.g., Carroll & Sapinski, supra note 15, at 180 (stating that “interlocking directorates . . . may 
enable coordination of business strategies”). 
 19 See infra notes 271–273 and accompanying text. 
 20 See generally, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583 (2018) (offering qualified support for the reinvigoration of antitrust law); 
Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 12 (presenting the current arguments in support of a consumer protection 
view of antitrust laws); Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMP. L. & 
ECON. 133 (2010) (analyzing the various sets of circumstances under which antitrust laws can hurt 
consumers); Sean P. Sullivan, What Structural Presumption?: Reuniting Evidence and Economics on the 
Role of Market Concentration in Horizontal Merger Analysis, 42 J. CORP. L. 403 (2016) (outlining the 
current debate in antitrust law about market concentration evidence); Samuel N. Weinstein, When 
Systemic Risk Meets Antitrust: Dodd-Frank’s Impact on Competitive Markets in the Wake of an Economic 
Crisis, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 286 (2016) (analyzing gaps in the current antitrust laws). 
 21 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and 
Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2017–18 (2018) (“In practice, merger policy has sought to 
promote competition by applying the consumer welfare standard, under which a merger is judged to be 
anticompetitive if it disrupts the competitive process and harms trading parties on the other side of the 
market.”); D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055 
(2010) (analyzing antitrust institutions); D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger 
Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45 (2011) (providing an overview of 
antitrust merger practice). 
 22 Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016) (defining 
horizontal shareholding as “when a common set of investors own significant shares in corporations that 
are horizontal competitors in a product market”). 
 23 See id.; José Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018); 
Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 
2026 (2018); Miguel Antón et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives 
(Fin. Working Paper No. 511/2017, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2802332 [https://perma.cc/28VT-
Q8KN]; Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor 
Involvement in Corporate Governance (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 17-05, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2925855 [https://perma.cc/ULZ2-EEHJ]; 
Einer Elhauge, New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal Shareholding (Jan. 4, 2018), 
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scholars have raised concerns regarding the incentives of companies to 
compete where major institutional shareholders hold large equity positions 
in all competitors.24 
Yet, the board—a middle layer between market consolidation and 
common ownership—has been left underexplored from an antitrust 
perspective. Horizontal directors could have a similar, yet overlooked, 
anticompetitive effect on the market.25 In fact, horizontal directors could 
provide a much simpler route for collusion or unlawful coordination. 
Take, for example, Apple and Google. The two tech giants are 
competing with increasing frequency, yet previously shared a director. 
Google CEO Eric Schmidt served on the boards of both companies until 
2009, when he was forced to step down from the Apple board following a 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation into whether the two 
companies violated antitrust laws by virtue of his shared service on their 
respective boards.26 Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and civil plaintiffs 
settled with the firms because of their alleged violation of antitrust laws, 
stemming in part from direct communications between Schmidt and Steve 
Jobs regarding anticompetitive employment practices.27 
 
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3096812 [https://perma.cc/UR4Q-K9TQ]; Andrea Pawliczek & A. Nicole 
Skinner, Common Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure (June 8, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3002075 [https://perma.cc/X455-T96Y]; John R. Woodbury, Can Institutional 
Investors Soften Downstream Market Competition? (June 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2993433 
[https://perma.cc/VY2Q-FK5B]; see also Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership Concentration and 
Corporate Conduct, 10 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 413 (2018). 
 24 See Schmalz, supra note 23. 
 25 Buch-Hansen, supra note 16, at 250–53 (describing research suggesting that interlocking 
directorates could facilitate collusion); Maralynne Flehner, Section 8 of the Clayton Act Applicable to 
Corporations (SCM Corp. v. FTC), 53 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 234, 239 (1979); James T. Halverson, Should 
Interlocking Director Relationships Be Subject to Regulation and, If So, What Kind?, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 
341, 347–49 (1976) (“While it seems unlikely, with counsel in attendance and recordation of minutes, 
that the boardroom serves today as a center of collusion, the potential for competitive abuses inherent in 
a horizontal interlocking relationship has not abated.”). 
 26 Brad Stone, Google Chief Gives Up Board Seat at Apple, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/technology/companies/04apple.html [https://perma.cc/29QH-
75A7]. It is worth noting that while serving as a compelling example of the potential antitrust concerns 
regarding horizontal directors, the FTC enforcement of these restrictions is severely inconsistent and often 
nonexistent, which further validates the concerns underscored in this Article. See infra Section III.C. 
 27 Dan Levine, U.S. Judge Approves $415 Mln Settlement in Tech Worker Lawsuit, REUTERS (Sept. 
3, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/apple-google-ruling/u-s-judge-approves-415-mln-settlement-
in-tech-worker-lawsuit-idUSL1N11908520150903 [https://perma.cc/S494-84MZ]; Justice Department 
Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation 
Agreements, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee [https://perma.cc/LB9D-
VNN3]. 
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Importantly, horizontal directors are not merely an isolated outlier. This 
Article empirically documents a troubling reality: hundreds of busy directors 
serve on multiple companies operating within the same industry. For 
instance, in 2016, 2,180 directors in the S&P 1500 served in at least two 
companies in the same industry.28 Even more significantly, the number and 
percentage of horizontal directors have been steadily increasing over time.29 
At the same time, corporate disclosure of directors’ concurrent horizontal 
positions remains sparse, which may have prevented shareholders and 
regulators from realizing the true prevalence of these horizontal directors.30 
Recognizing that horizontal directors sit at the intersection of critical 
emerging areas in both antitrust and corporate governance offers a unique 
challenge and opportunity. As firms continue to grow and evolve, and the 
lines of industry definition continue to flex to accommodate expansion such 
as that of Apple, Google, Amazon, and others, antitrust and corporate 
governance law must enforce the current policies while also continuing to 
adapt. Indeed, the Google–Apple collusion case31 exemplifies the concern 
that horizontal directors pose from an antitrust perspective. The same 
example also demonstrates why, from a corporate governance perspective, 
companies may still choose to engage in horizontal directorships and reap 
the benefits these directors may present to shareholders.32 
This Article fills the current gap regarding horizontal directorships both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, the Article provides a thorough 
overview of horizontal directors from corporate and antitrust perspectives. 
Empirically, the Article is the first to provide data on the nature of directors’ 
service on multiple horizontal boards. This Article’s account has the 
potential to open a new field for scholarly research that examines horizontal 
directors’ impact on both corporate governance and antitrust metrics. It also 
provides policymakers and shareholder advocates with important data that 
could spur regulatory change. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I starts by providing an overview 
of how boards of directors function, the potential benefits and costs of 
directors who serve on multiple boards, and the unique case of horizontal 
directors. Part I then provides a detailed account of the current legal 
framework governing and regulating horizontal directors. Part II provides 
 
 28 See infra Section II.A.2, Table 3. 
 29 For instance, the number of directors sharing two boards in the same SIC code has risen from 7.4% 
to 10.9% of the S&P 1500 directors over a seven-year span. Similar trends are noticeable across the 
various horizontal metrics. See infra Table 5. 
 30 See infra Sections I.D.5 & II.B. 
 31 See Stone, supra note 26. 
 32 See infra Section III.B. 
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the empirical results of the S&P 1500 director dataset and company 
disclosure practices analyses, revealing the increasing prevalence of 
horizontal directors despite the regulatory framework currently in place. It 
explores important questions: Are horizontal directors more likely to serve 
on more than two boards in the same industry? Do they tend to diversify 
across different market cap firms? Do they serve on similar committees 
across different boards? Are horizontal directors more likely to be executives 
of other companies? Are specific industries more likely to attract horizontal 
directors? Each of these questions has direct policy ramifications both on the 
desirability of horizontal directorships as a whole as well as on specific 
underlying issues. Part III discusses and analyzes the implications of those 
results in more detail in light of the potential benefits and concerns horizontal 
directors may bring. Part IV then takes the first steps in connecting the 
antitrust and corporate governance literatures in the context of horizontal 
directors, offering a unique bridge between the distinct legal and policy 
questions that they present. More specifically, the Article presents a set of 
potential reforms to address both antitrust and corporate governance 
concerns, calling for better corporate disclosure, the revision of director 
independence requirements, and regulatory and legislative reforms. 
I. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS—WHAT’S AT STAKE 
The emergent literature on director busyness focuses on a single metric 
of busyness: the number of boards on which a director serves.33 This metric, 
however, is insufficient to address the effects of busyness on director 
performance. The various company boards on which a busy director serves 
are not interchangeable; company size, industry, culture, and markets are all 
variables that directly affect how a busy director impacts a company’s board. 
This Part addresses and develops this normative insight. It discusses the 
central role of directors in corporate governance, drawing attention to the 
prevalence of busy directors across companies in the U.S. It then highlights 
and describes one specific variety of busy directors—horizontal directors—
and their importance to consumer welfare and to the governance of public 
corporations. 
 
 33 See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Board’s Role in Corporate Governance 
As the core organ of the modern corporation,34 the board is tasked with 
several important governance roles. First, while most of the operational 
decision-making can be, and is, delegated to management, the board is still 
required to be an active participant in some of the more important managerial 
business decisions, such as mergers, stock issuance, and changes to company 
governance documents.35 Second, the board is a management resource. The 
board provides advice and insight, as well as networking benefits, and 
facilitates the firm’s access to various resources.36 
The board is also charged with a monitoring role.37 Shareholders’ lack 
of incentive to supervise management due to their dispersed ownership, 
coupled with free-riding concerns, effectively enables managers, and not 
shareholders, to control the corporation.38 One of the first institutions asked 
to mitigate this concern is the board of directors.39 The board is expected to 
 
 34 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 51 (2008) 
(citing the board as the “epicenter” of the modern corporation); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of 
Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. 
REV. 375, 375–76 (1975) (discussing the board of directors as the core of modern corporate decision-
making); Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Sept. 8, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/08/principles-of-corporate-
governance [https://perma.cc/99RC-2SBV] (discussing the board of directors’ vital role in overseeing the 
company’s management and business strategies to achieve long-term value creation). 
 35 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 45 
(2012). 
 36 See MACEY, supra note 34, at 51; cf. id. at 46. 
 37 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
155 (2008) (detailing the role of the board in monitoring management); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards 
Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–72 (1997). 
 38 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 6 (1932); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing 
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 278 (2003) (“Any single shareholder who 
expends additional resources in monitoring management or coordinating with other shareholders to 
change management will typically bear the costs alone, while the profits generated by such action are 
shared by all shareholders, including those who do not contribute.”); Emeka Duruigbo, Stimulating Long-
Term Shareholding, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1733, 1765–69 (2012); Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder 
Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1407–08 (2014) (recognizing that 
collective-action and free-riding concerns make shareholders reluctant to initiate activism); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1, 22 (1988) (discussing the free-riding concern under a dual-class stock lens). The resulting costs 
are often referred to as “agency costs.” Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership 
and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983) (defining agency costs as the “costs of structuring, 
monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests”). 
 39 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1465 (2007) (describing “the shift 
to shareholder value as the primary corporate objective” and arguing for the value of independent 
directors). 
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represent shareholders’ interests, vis-à-vis management, curtailing 
management’s ability to extract private benefits or act in a suboptimal way 
with respect to shareholder interests.40 
In addition, the board has also become a pivotal actor within state law. 
Delaware, for example, gives independent boards more latitude when 
reviewing their decisions41 and has emphasized the importance of directors 
in the governance of corporations.42 
Finally, the board has become a means for investors to formally and 
informally engage with the company.43 The recent rise in shareholder 
activism by hedge funds44 combined with institutional investors’ increased 
engagement45 has empowered shareholders to take a more active role, and 
accordingly, the board has taken on a key role in engaging with 
shareholders.46 The board, therefore, has become a conduit, allowing 
 
 40 See Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 155–
57 (2008) (describing directors’ fiduciary duty to adopt shareholders’ ends); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra 
note 37, at 160–63 (detailing the monitoring role of the board and its importance in the governance of the 
firm). 
 41 “Delaware courts, in particular, have strengthened the appeal of independent directors by giving 
credit to conflicted transactions that were vetted and approved by a special committee comprised of 
independent directors.” Da Lin, Beyond Beholden, 44 J. CORP. LAW 515, 522 (2019); see also Kahn v. M 
& F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (explaining that “where the controller irrevocably 
and publicly disables itself from using its control to dictate the outcome of the negotiations and the 
shareholder vote [by employing an independent board and shareholder approval], the controlled merger 
then acquires the shareholder-protective characteristics of third-party, arm’s-length mergers, which are 
reviewed under the business judgment standard”). 
 42 See Maureen S. Brundage & Oliver C. Brahmst, Director Independence: Alive and Well Under 
Delaware Law, in THE GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDE 2004: BEST PRACTICE IN THE 
BOARDROOM (2004) (supporting Delaware’s approach). 
 43 See Martin Lipton, Spotlight on Boards 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 31, 
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/31/spotlight-on-boards-2018/ [https://perma.cc/84M2-
HEZA]. 
 44 See, e.g., Matthew R. Denes et al., Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical 
Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405, 406 (2017) (discussing “the rise of hedge fund activism”); Stuart L. Gillan 
& Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
55, 68 (2007) (“[H]edge funds have not only entered the shareholder activism arena, but have become a 
dominant force.”); Jim Rossman et al., Review of Shareholder Activism: 1H 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (July 30, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/30/review-of-shareholder-
activism-1h-2018 [https://perma.cc/ZA9K-HCX3] (graphing hedge fund activism). 
 45 Paula Loop et al., The Changing Face of Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changing-face-of-
shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/5EYQ-JUTH]. 
 46 See Krystal Berrini & Rob Zivnuska, Board Lessons: Succeeding with Investors in a Crisis, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 5, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/05/board-
lessons-succeeding-with-investors-in-a-crisis/ [ https://perma.cc/CB8Z-EV4L]. 
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investors to better engage formally and informally with the company.47 In a 
recent letter, Vanguard, one of the world’s largest institutional investors, 
explained that it considers the board to be “one of a company’s most critical 
strategic assets” and that it looks for a “high-functioning, well-composed, 
independent, diverse, and experienced board with effective ongoing 
evaluation practices,” stating that “[g]ood governance starts with a great 
board.”48 
B. Busy Directors and Director Interlocks 
It is not surprising, then, that corporate governance discourse has 
become increasingly focused on issues related to board composition, 
independence, and the role of the board within the larger corporate 
governance ecosystem.49 Institutional investors have focused on a range of 
board composition issues, including director independence,50 CEO–Chair 
 
 47 Lipton, supra note 43; see also Matteo Tonello & Matteo Gatti, Board-Shareholder Engagement 
Practices, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 30, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/30/board-shareholder-engagement-practices 
[https://perma.cc/7H97-M4T4]. 
 48 F. William McNabb III, An Open Letter to Directors of Public Companies Worldwide 1, 
VANGUARD (Aug. 31, 2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/governance-letter-to-
companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F3L-536X]. 
 49 See, e.g., Marc S. Gerber, US Corporate Governance: Boards of Directors Face Increased 
Scrutiny, SKADDEN (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2014/01/us-
corporate-governance-boards-of-directors-face-i [https://perma.cc/686A-KSKH]; Robert Hauswald & 
Robert Marquez, Governance Mechanisms, Corporate Disclosure, and the Role of Technology (Mar. 
2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=890360 [https://perma.cc/G82G-NPBK]. 
 50 See Gordon, supra note 39, at 1540; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the 
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865 (1991); Yaron Nili, 
The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 100 (2016) 
[hereinafter Nili, New Insiders]; Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 
92 N.C. L. REV. 855, 855 (2014). 
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separation,51 term limits,52 board refreshment,53 diversity,54 and board 
evaluation processes,55 as well as disclosure on these issues.56 
An additional key topic that has drawn investor and academic attention 
is the issue of directors who serve on multiple boards.57 Two distinct strands 
of literature on this topic have emerged. First, there is literature, mostly in 
finance, focusing on the busyness aspect of a director. In that respect, the 
literature centers on whether directors who hold several board positions have 
an impact on company performance or other governance metrics.58 The 
“busy director” literature therefore is focused on the number of boards a 
director serves on.59 Because directors spend, on average, 245 hours per year 
 
 51 Lisa M. Fairfax, Separation Anxiety: A Cautious Endorsement of the Independent Board Chair, 
47 IND. L. REV. 237, 238–39 (2014); Yaron Nili, Successor CEOs, 99 B.U. L. REV. 787, 791 (2019) 
[hereinafter Nili, Successor CEOs] (recognizing that investors and academics have pushed for separating 
the roles in recent years). 
 52 See generally William M. Libit & Todd E. Freier, Director Tenure: The Next Boardroom Battle, 
THE CORPORATE BOARD (Mar./Apr. 2015) (discussing advocate positions on tenure). 
 53 Cam C. Hoang, Institutional Investors and Trends in Board Refreshment, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Apr. 8, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04/08/institutional-investors-and-
trends-in-board-refreshment/ [https://perma.cc/C62J-5J4U] (discussing and sampling institutional 
investor guidance on board refreshment). 
 54 Eleanor Bloxham, Institutional Investors Are Leading the Fight for More Diverse Corporate 
Boards, FORTUNE (June 16, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/16/institutional-investors-are-leading-the-
fight-for-more-diverse-corporate-boards [https://perma.cc/8PEP-5FCX]. 
 55 Francesco Surace, Evaluating Board Skills (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.morrowsodali.com/uploads/articles/attachments/1496827065-A.0279.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KHT3-PA9K] (“Morrow Sodali’s latest Institutional Investor Survey shows that the 
board skills matrix is viewed as a key disclosure item by investors representing $18 trillion of assets under 
management—78% of respondents—when voting on director elections.”). 
 56 CamberView Partners, NYC Pension Funds Boardroom Accountability Project Version 2.0, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/19/nyc-pension-funds-boardroom-accountability-project-
version-2-0/ [https://perma.cc/65BP-TZJ2]. 
 57 The finance literature often uses the term “busy directors,” see, e.g., supra note 7, while the legal 
literature has used “interlocks” more often. Often, investors and proxy advisors also use the term 
“overboarding,” which is similar in concept to the term “busy director.” See, e.g., Kosmas Papadopoulos, 
Director Overboarding: Global Trends, Definitions, and Impact, ISS ANALYTICS (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/library/director-overboarding-global-trends-definitions-and-impact/ 
[https://perma.cc/G2H6-7R6Q]. 
 58 See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
 59 While director busyness increases with each additional board seat, there is some ambiguity in the 
current literature regarding what qualifies a director as “busy.” Some studies consider a director as busy 
if she serves on more than one board. See, e.g., Antonio Falato et al., Distracted Directors: Does Board 
Busyness Hurt Shareholder Value?, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 404, 405 (2014) (“We consider directors that hold 
an outside board seat on at least two firms, firm A and firm B, and are subject to shocks originating from 
the death of either the CEO or a colleague on the board of, say, firm A.”); Stephen P. Ferris et al., Too 
Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments, 58 J. FIN. 1087, 
1091 (2003); Fich & Shivdasani, Busy Boards, supra note 9, at 689 (using the larger, “three or more” 
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on board-related activities,60 when a director sits on multiple boards, 
combined at 245 hours per year, per board, one can see how these directors 
are busy. This is particularly true for the many directors who hold other 
concurrent full-time jobs as executives.61 
The second strand of literature concerns the connection between two 
companies that is facilitated by sharing a director, often termed an 
“interlock.”62 In that respect, it is not necessarily important how busy a 
director is, but rather how a director provides a connection or a bridge 
between the two companies in which she serves. 
Busy directors, and the interlocks they create, are a natural byproduct 
of corporate culture. “Because many companies seek operational and 
executive experience in their board nominees in order to raise investor 
confidence in the board,” the pool from which companies elect directors is 
fairly limited.63 Companies often treat prior board experience as a plus in a 
nomination process,64 so it should not come as a total surprise that close to 
40% of the directors of public companies in the U.S. serve on multiple 
boards.65 Whether due to overlapping nomination criteria among boards,66 
 
metric); Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis, 
59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 878 (2018). This article will consider directors busy if they serve on more than one 
board, as serving on even two boards operating in the same industry brings the potential dangers and 
benefits of horizontal directorship. 
 60 Neil Amato, 6 Barriers Limiting Boards’ Strategic Oversight, FIN. MGMT. MAG. (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.fm-magazine.com/news/2016/dec/barriers-limiting-board-strategic-oversight-
201615754.html [https://perma.cc/4UNF-9SQ7]. 
 61 See SPENCER STUART, 2019 U.S. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 13 (2019), 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/ssbi-2019/us_board_index_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/468L-9Z5Z] (finding that 15% of new S&P 500 independent directors are active CEOs). 
 62 See, e.g., Barzuza & Curtis, Outside Directors’ Protection, supra note 8 (examining the 
relationship between interlocks and indemnification protection); Barzuza & Curtis, Board Interlocks and 
Corporate Governance, supra note 15, at 669 (“[W]e summarize the literature on interlocks and 
governance . . . .”); Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The Effects 
of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935 (2003) (empirical analysis finding that 
mutual interlocks increase CEO compensation and decrease CEO turnover); Nai H. Lamb, Does the 
Number of Interlocking Directors Influence a Firm’s Financial Performance? An Exploratory Meta-
Analysis, 17 AM. J. MGMT. 47, 51 (2017) (finding “little relationship between interlocking directors and 
financial performance”). 
 63 Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145, 
158 (2019) [hereinafter Nili, Beyond the Numbers]. 
 64 See Renée B. Adams et al., Director Skill Sets, 130 J. FIN. ECON. 641, 646 (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2365748 [https://perma.cc/V639-LQGX] (finding that 13% of nominating 
committees specifically list outside board experience as a qualification for inclusion as a nominee). 
 65 See infra Section II.A.2, Table 2. Additionally, S&P 500 independent directors serve on an average 
of 2.1 public corporation boards. SPENCER STUART, supra note 61, at 17. 
 66 See AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY 40 (2015) (citation omitted) 
(describing the prior-qualifications problem and stating, “CEO experience has become ‘a quick litmus 
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the tendency and capability of directors to network with other directors, or 
the prerequisite qualification of prior experience,67 many directors are tapped 
to serve on multiple boards at once.68 
The primary value of having a busy director on a company’s board 
comes from a combination of a director’s experience, connections, and 
insider expertise, all of which less experienced and less networked directors 
may be unable to provide.69 Their value, however, is not as pronounced 
across all firms. Several studies focusing on value creation by busy directors 
find that the smaller the firm, the greater the value created for the firm.70 
Smaller firms do not necessarily have the connections to other corporations 
that busy directors bring into the boardroom.71 Thus, small firms can rely on 
these busy directors to provide experience and industry knowledge that 
would otherwise be absent.72 While value creation also occurs in mid-sized 
firms, much of this benefit disappears when entering the Fortune 500.73 At 
large-cap companies, the firm leadership has enough connections and 
 
test for qualified board candidates’”); Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women 
Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 599 (2006) ( “[M]ost 
corporations appear to adopt the same general criteria when selecting directors.”). 
 67 Nili, Beyond the Numbers, supra note 63, at 158; see also Adams et al., supra note 64, at 44. 
 68 See Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: 
An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1846 (1999); Todd Wallack & Sacha Pfeiffer, Debate Swirls on 




 69 See, e.g., Wolfgang Drobetz et al., Industry Expert Directors, 92 J. BANK. & FIN.195, 195 (2018) 
(analyzing “the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which industry 
experience of outside directors relates to firm value,” and finding that “firms with more experienced 
outside directors are valued at a premium compared to firms with less experienced outside directors”); 
Laura Field et al., Are Busy Boards Detrimental?, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 63–64 (2013) (finding that 
venture-backed IPO firms benefit from busy director expertise, as busy directors serve more as advisors 
than monitors); Ira C. Harris & Katsuhiko Shimizu, Too Busy to Serve? An Examination of the Influence 
of Overboarded Directors, 41 J. MGMT. STUD. 775, 775 (2004) (finding that busy directors enhance 
acquisition performance through expertise). 
 70 See George D. Cashman et al., Going Overboard? On Busy Directors and Firm Value, 36 J. BANK. 
& FIN. 3248, 3252 (2012). 
 71 Ferris et al., supra note 59, at 1097 (“[F]irms with larger boards present greater opportunities for 
board members to make connections leading to additional invitations to serve on other boards.”). 
 72 Field et al., supra note 69, at 65 (arguing that smaller, less established firms might benefit from 
busy directors’ connections and experience); see also David J. Denis et al., The Selection of Directors to 
Corporate Boards 1 (2018), https://ssrn.com/a=3215474 [https://perma.cc/HB7N-KKLR] (finding that 
“post-spinoff unit and remaining parent firms are more likely to select pre-spinoff parent directors who 
have []relevant industry expertise”). 
 73 Field et al., supra note 69, at 65. 
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knowledge of the industry and instead requires directors to focus on 
monitoring management rather than advising it.74 
Yet, even in larger firms where value creation through director 
connections and advising becomes less pronounced, busy directors can still 
provide benefits when the company has directors in common with a target in 
a merger or acquisition.75 Additionally, when a company announces the 
appointment of a director concurrently serving on multiple boards, firms 
report positive returns associated with such an announcement.76 However, it 
is unclear whether these returns are related to the busy director’s clout or 
experience, or necessarily to that director at all.77 
C. Horizontal Directors 
The current focus on a director’s level of busyness78 as a metric for 
corporate performance79 and other governance metrics80 has resulted in a 
significant gap in the literature. Surprisingly, current literature has mostly 
failed to address the specific attributes of busy directors or the companies 
they serve. This Article is the first to dissect and address the prevalence of 
directors taking board positions on multiple boards within the same 
 
 74 Id. at 73 (“[O]ur findings highlight the extent to which the effects of busy boards vary across firms 
at different points in their lifecycle. Firms such as those in the Forbes 500 are likely to have large networks 
of connections, suggesting that the connectedness of busy directors would be less advantageous to 
them.”). 
 75 See Ye Cai & Merih Sevilir, Board Connections and M&A Transactions, 103 J. FIN. ECON. 327, 
327 (2012). But see Joy Ishii & Yuhai Xuan, Acquirer-Target Social Ties and Merger Outcomes, 112 J. 
FIN. ECON. 344, 345 (2014). 
 76 Ferris et al., supra note 59, at 1088 (finding that firms announcing the appointment of a busy 
director for the first time “experience significantly positive abnormal returns”). 
 77 See id. at 1096. 
 78 See, e.g., Cashman et al., supra note 70, at 3252; Harris & Shimizu, supra note 69, at 775 (finding 
that “overboarded directors”—the paper’s term for busy directors—enhance corporate governance, but 
focusing solely on the amount of boards as a measure). 
 79 See, e.g., Roie Hauser, Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mergers, 128 J. FIN. 
ECON. 16, 34 (2018) (analyzing whether multiple directorships impact firm outcomes); David F. Larcker 
et al., Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance, 55 J. ACCT. & ECON. 225, 248–49 (2013) (analyzing 
the effect of director connections on corporate performance). 
 80  Renée B. Adams et al., Board Diversity: Moving the Field Forward, 23 CORP. GOV. 77, 77 (2015); 
Benson et al., supra note 7, at 2; Anna Bergman Brown et al., Too Busy or Well-Connected? Evidence 
from a Shock to Multiple Directorships, 94 ACCT. REV. 83, 83 (2019) (“We document that firms 
experiencing a decrease in multiple directorships due to M&A exhibit improved operating performance, 
monitoring, and strategic advising, on average.”); Fich & Shivdasani, Busy Boards, supra note 9, at 689 
(finding that “firms with busy boards . . . are associated with weak corporate governance”); Kress, supra 
note 59, at 878 (“[T]he directors of the United States’ largest financial institutions are too busy to fulfill 
their governance responsibilities.”); Pradit Withisuphakorn & Pornsit Jiraporn, Are Busy Directors 
Harmful or Helpful? Evidence from the Great Recession, B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL. 1 (2018); 
Ljungqvist & Raff, supra note 7, at 1. 
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industry.81 Directors in this group are not only busy directors, but also 
horizontal directors. 
Take, for example, William Grubbs, who simultaneously served on the 
boards of two workforce-solution staffing firms: Volt Information Sciences, 
Inc., and Cross Country Healthcare.82 The former provides staffing, managed 
services, and outsourcing services to companies worldwide,83 while the latter 
bills itself as the nation’s leading primary-healthcare-staffing and workforce-
solution provider.84 Another example is William Bock, who sits on the 
boards of two companies that make semiconductors for the connected 
home.85 The energy industry offers yet another prime example of these 
concerns: Apache and Cimarex compete in the petroleum- and natural-gas-
exploration-and-production field,86 and they shared a director. In fact, F.H. 
Merelli served as Chairman and CEO of Cimarex between 2002 and 2011 
while concurrently serving as a director of Apache Corporation.87 
Directors’ service on companies’ boards within the same industry raises 
significant concerns. As this Article further develops, horizontal directorship 
may spur governance and antitrust concerns. First, data flow between 
companies within the same sphere that is facilitated through horizontal 
directors may lead to antitrust concerns of collaboration and collusion. 
Second, horizontal directors may increase the concern of systemic 
 
 81 An article from 2015 focused on financial firms only. See Berg et al., supra note 10, at 2. 
 82 CROSS COUNTRY HEALTHCARE (2019), https://www.crosscountryhealthcare.com/home 
[https://perma.cc/XRH2-DF9X]; Corporate Profile, VOLT, http://www.volt.com/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/A6V4-M47B]. Grubbs was also the CEO of Cross Country Healthcare at this time. See 
Board of Directors, VOLT, https://investor.volt.com/board-of-directors [https://perma.cc/YQ8X-C9NL]. 
 83 Overview of Volt’s Businesses, VOLT, http://www.volt.com/businesses/ [https://perma.cc/R294-
4355]. 
 84 About Us, CROSS COUNTRY HEALTHCARE, https://www.crosscountryhealthcare.com/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/8YS8-4TWK]. 
 85 Photo Release: Entropic Communications Names William G. Bock to Board of Directors, GLOBE 
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2012/10/01/494414/ 
10006724/en/Photo-Release-Entropic-Communications-Names-William-G-Bock-to-Board-of-
Directors.html [https://perma.cc/QR4M-QUCD]; About Us, SILICON LABS (2019), 
https://www.silabs.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/SZ65-VYBL]. 
 86 1980s, APACHE CORP., http://www.apachecorp.com/About_Apache/History/1980s.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4UG7-MZSK]; Press Release, Helmerich & Payne, Helmerich & Payne Completes 
Spin-off and Merger of Cimarex Energy Co. (Sept. 30, 2002), https://helmerichandpayneinc.gcs-
web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/helmerich-payne-completes-spin-and-merger-cimarex-
energy-co [https://perma.cc/3SGF-S6K2]. 
 87 Obituary, F.H. “Mick” Merelli, CASPER STAR-TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2012), 
https://trib.com/lifestyles/announcements/obituaries/f-h-mick-merelli/article_362d30ce-e719-11e1-
a999-001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/9NYB-A72T]. 
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governance risk. Third, interlocking within an industry may compromise 
director independence, board composition, and pay practices.88 
These potential concerns are heightened due to the prevalence of 
horizontal directors. Examining data on all directors in the S&P 1500 
companies between 2010 and 2016, Part II of this Article reveals that a large 
percentage of busy directors serve on boards of at least two companies within 
the same industry. In fact, in 2016, 2,180 directors served in at least two 
companies within the same industry, and 499 directors served in at least two 
companies in the same Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.89 On 
the company level, the number and percentage of companies having at least 
one horizontal director is also significant. In 2016, 81.1% of companies had 
at least one industry-horizontal director on their board, and 26.8% of 
companies had at least one director who served on boards of two or more 
companies in the same SIC code.90 Moreover, of the companies with 
horizontal directors, a substantial percentage had more than one horizontal 
director. In 2016, 62.5% of the companies in the sample had more than one 
industry-horizontal director and 10.6% had more than one SIC-horizontal 
director.91 
While service on the boards of two competitors may be concerning in 
and of itself, there is reason to become even more concerned. The rise in 
horizontal directors comes against a backdrop of increased concentration in 
the U.S. markets. More than 75% of U.S. industries experienced a rise in 
concentration levels92 in recent years.93 As industries become more 
concentrated, the anticompetitive concerns of collusion and price-fixing 
 
 88 See infra Section III.B.1. 
 89 See infra Table 4. The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) classifies industries by a four-digit 
code. The SIC codes are then grouped into progressively broader industry classifications: industry group, 
major group, and division. The third digit of the SIC code indicates the industry group, and the first two 
digits indicate the major group. See Frequently Asked Questions, NAICS ASS’N (2018), 
https://www.naics.com/frequently-asked-questions/#SICfaq [https://perma.cc/Y8T7-5TXN]. 
 90 See infra Section II.A.3, Table 6. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Concentration, in this context, is used as a measure of competition in the industry. A low 
concentration number indicates a high level of competition, while a high concentration level indicates a 
lower level of competition in the industry. See Sean P. Sullivan, What Structural Presumption?: Reuniting 
Evidence and Economics on the Role of Market Concentration in Horizontal Merger Analysis, 42 J. 
CORP. L. 403, 408–10 (2016). 
 93 Gustavo Grullon et al., Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated? 2, 6–11 (Rev. Fin. 
Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper No. 19-41, 2018), https://ssrn.com/a=2612047 [https://perma.cc/P9TA-
9M3U] (finding that more than 75% of U.S. industries have experienced an increase in concentration 
levels over the last two decades). 
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intensify, therefore also escalating the potential impact of horizontal 
directors. 
Finally, compounding the issue even further, the demarcation lines of 
horizontalness are becoming murkier, and it is becoming increasingly more 
difficult to ascertain which firms are horizontal competitors in the first place. 
As the breadth and scope of firms’ product lines grow, it becomes harder to 
reconcile traditional characterizations of industry classification against the 
potential for anticompetitive effects.94 For instance, Apple and Nike 
announced in September 2016 a co-venture for Apple Watch Nike+, “the 
latest result of a long-standing partnership” between the brands.95 The 
initiative, however, followed the appointment of Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, 
as Nike’s lead independent director.96 Cook’s influence in both firms could 
lead to rational coordinated conduct of both firms in further forays into 
wearable tech or other similar markets. Google has also made recent 
headlines through a collaboration “with one of the U.S.’s largest health-care 
systems,” Ascension, which comes amidst reports that other tech behemoths 
such as Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft are “aggressively pushing into health 
care,” an industry not currently thought to compete with technology 
industries.97 Increasingly blurred industry lines may continue to raise 
concerns of unlawful collaboration and collusion between companies not 
traditionally thought to be competitors. 
D. The Regulatory Framework 
Horizontal directorships are subject to several regulatory and market 
restrictions. Importantly, while antitrust, corporate, and securities laws do 
 
 94 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 
1, 3 (2007) (discussing the “potential tension between competition and innovation”); Charlene L. 
Nicholls-Nixon & Dale Jasinski, The Blurring of Industry Boundaries: An Explanatory Model Applied to 
Telecommunications, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 755, 755–56, 758 (1995) (examining the phenomenon 
within the telecommunications industry); Eamonn Kelly, Blurring Boundaries, Uncharted Frontiers, in 
DELOITTE, BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS COME OF AGE 17, 19 (2015) (e-book), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/business-trends/2015/business-ecosystems-boundaries-
business-trends.html#endnote-sup-9 [https://perma.cc/MM4B-DV9E]. 
 95 Press Release, Apple, Apple & Nike Launch the Perfect Running Partner, Apple Watch Nike+ 
(Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.apple.com/newsroom/2016/09/apple-nike-launch-apple-watch-nike/ 
[https://perma.cc/J2N3-2WNR]. 
 96 John Kell & Jonathan Vanian, Tim Cook Becomes Nike’s Lead Independent Director, FORTUNE 
(June 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/30/apple-ceo-tim-cook-nike [https://perma.cc/TM4E-
8UW5]. 
 97 Rob Copeland, Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions of 
Americans, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-s-secret-project-
nightingale-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of-americans-11573496790?mod=hp_lead_pos1 
[https://perma.cc/Y67F-3ETT]. 
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not explicitly prohibit horizontal directorships,98 horizontal directorships 
must be analyzed against a regulatory backdrop that is concerned with the 
potential for collusion between competitor companies sharing a director.99 
Antitrust laws prohibit the service of one director on boards of two 
competing companies. Additionally, fiduciary duties, stock exchange rules, 
shareholder advisory firms, institutional investors’ voting policies, and 
companies’ own policies add a second layer of potential restrictions on 
horizontal directors’ service.100 This Section examines the various existing 
channels through which horizontal directors are regulated and details the 
potential limitations of the current system in addressing horizontal directors. 
1. Antitrust: Section 8 of the Clayton Act 
Antitrust regulations aim to ensure healthy and robust competition 
among firms.101 Most often, these laws focus on the business activity of 
firms—“online, in stores, or on the street.”102 Yet, an often-overlooked 
section of these laws extends into the corporate boardroom and its 
composition: Section 8 of the Clayton Act.103 
 
 98 See infra Section I.D. 
 99 See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (stating that 
Section 8 of the Clayton Act serves a prophylactic purpose “to nip in the bud incipient violations of the 
antitrust laws by removing the opportunity or temptation to such violations through interlocking 
directorates”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tullett Prebon and ICAP Restructure Transaction 
After Justice Department Expresses Concerns About Interlocking Directorates (July 14, 2016) 
[hereinafter Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tullett Prebon], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/tullett-
prebon-and-icap-restructure-transaction-after-justice-department-expresses-concerns 
[https://perma.cc/TZE9-XMRE] (“‘Robust competition depends on competitors being actually 
independent of each other—that’s what Section 8 [of the Clayton Act] requires,’ said Principal Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse of the department’s Antitrust Division. ‘As originally proposed, 
this deal would have violated that core principle—creating a cozy relationship among competitors.’”). 
 100 See Antonio Falato et al., Distracted Directors: Does Board Busyness Hurt Shareholder Value?, 
113 J. FIN. ECON. 404, 404–05 (2014) (mentioning restrictions set by firms themselves and limits 
recommended by the Institutional Shareholder Services). 
 101 Andrea Agathoklis Murino & Kirby H. Lewis, Board Interlocks on Antitrust Enforcement Hot 
Seat: A Must-Read Guide for Board Members and Officers, GOODWIN ALERT (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.goodwinlaw.com/publications/2016/08/08_17_16-board-interlocks-on-antitrust-
enforcement [https://perma.cc/6QEG-A2EX]; see also KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 40 (2003); Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional 
Politics, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 123 (2018); David Wessel, Is Lack of Competition Strangling the 
U.S. Economy?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/is-lack-of-competition-
strangling-the-u-s-economy [https://perma.cc/5HKW-WQUD] (“In remedying the harmful effects of 
industry consolidation and declining competition, an obvious place to start is antitrust regulation and 
enforcement.”). 
 102 Murino & Lewis, supra note 101. 
 103 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
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Antitrust literature has long highlighted the concern that common 
directors may help companies to collude at the expense of consumers,104 and 
antitrust law has directly addressed this concern. Section 8 of the Clayton 
Act prohibits an individual or entity from serving on the board or as an 
officer of two competing corporations.105 The enumerated policy behind 
Section 8 rests on a desire to ensure that firms do not coordinate their activity 
through a common board member or officer106 and to “nip in the bud incipient 
violations of the antitrust laws.”107 
The elements of a Section 8 violation are: (1) there must be 
simultaneous directorship108 on at least two corporations; (2) at least one of 
the corporations must have “capital, surplus and undivided profits” that meet 
a certain monetary threshold;109 (3) the corporations must be engaged in 
whole or in part in commerce;110 and (4) the corporations must be 
competitors.111 Horizontal directors that serve on boards of firms operating 
within the same industry thus risk violating Section 8 of the Clayton Act.112 
Therefore, the major question for analyzing antitrust issues of horizontal 
directorship is whether the two companies in question are indeed considered 
“competitors,” as the Clayton Act requires. 
Section 8’s “competition” requirement is broader than it may initially 
seem.113 The application of the term “in competition” extends beyond the 
 
 104 Buch-Hansen, supra note 16, at 249–50 (“It is widely believed that interlocking directorates—
situations in which directors sit on more than one company board—have the potential to facilitate 
collusion.”). 
 105 See 15 U.S.C. § 19. 
 106 Eric N. Fischer, Serving More Than One Master: A Social Network Analysis of Section 8 of the 
Clayton Act, 41 J. CORP. L. 313, 316 (2015) (explaining that the policy reason behind Section 8’s 
prohibition on interlocking directorates was to remove the opportunity to collude). 
 107 United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
 108 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1). The Act defines a “person” to include corporations, so corporations are 
subject to the prohibitions of Section 8. Id. § 12(a). Therefore, a company, through its deputized agents, 
cannot serve as a director on the board of a competing business. 
 109 Id. § 19(a)(1). Effective March 4, 2019, the threshold is $36,564,000, and the competitive sales 
of either corporation must be less than $3,656,400 or represent less than 2% of that firm’s total sales, or 
the competitive sales of each firm are less than 4% of that firm’s total sales. Id. § 19(a)(2); 84 Fed. Reg. 
7369 (March 4, 2019). 
 110 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(A). 
 111 Id. § 19(a)(1)(B). Proof of competition under the statute does not depend on a complex product 
market definition that may be required in a monopolization or merger case. See In re Borg-Warner Corp., 
101 F.T.C. 863, 905 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, Borg-Warner Corp. v. FTC, 746 F.2d 108, 111–12 
(2d Cir. 1984); see also 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B). 
 112 See Murino & Lewis, supra note 101. 
 113 Antitrust law has seen a shift toward standards that are determined ex post. Daniel A. Crane, Rules 
Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 50 (2007) (detailing the shift 
and the normative implications). 
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simple case of two corporations that “produce the same line of products in 
the same region and compete for the same business.”114 It also applies to 
corporations that sell “reasonably interchangeable products within the same 
geographic area,”115 as well as to “companies that vie for the business of the 
same prospective purchasers, even if the products they offer, unless 
modified, are sufficiently dissimilar to preclude a single purchaser from 
having a choice of a suitable product from each.”116 
Applying these provisions of the Clayton Act, courts have focused “not 
only on the degree of actual interchangeability of use between the products 
of alleged competitors, but also on evidence concerning (1) the extent to 
which the industry and its customers recognize the products as separate or 
competing; (2) the extent to which production techniques for the products 
are similar; and (3) the extent to which the products can be said to have 
distinctive customers.”117 
Additionally, antitrust concerns arise in the parent–subsidiary 
relationship when a subsidiary company’s competition may also be 
attributed to its parent company.118 Both the FTC and the DOJ have taken 
enforcement actions premised on such interlocks. For example, in Borg-
Warner Corp.,119 the FTC concluded that a parent company can be regarded 
as a “competitor” for purposes of Section 8 if the parent company is able to 
exercise control of or closely supervise the subsidiary.120 Conversely, courts 
have suggested that a parent corporation is not necessarily a competitor of 
 
 114 Dan A. Bailey, Interlocking Directorates: A Sleeping Bear Awakens?, 
https://baileycav.com/site/assets/files/1451/interlocking_directorates_-_a_sleeping_bear_awakens.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EJV-8ETB] (discussing Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1973)); 
see also United States v. Crocker Nat’l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 703–04 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“sales in the 
same product and geographic market”). 
 115 1 EARL W. KINTNER ET AL., 5 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 42.11 (2019) (citing Am. Bakeries 
Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Md. 1981)). 
 116 TRW, Inc. v. F.T.C., 647 F.2d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 117 Id. at 947. 
 118 See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Schneider, 760 F. Supp. 362, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[C]ompetition 
with a subsidiary may be properly deemed to a parent corporation where the parent closely controls or 
dictates the policy of its subsidiary.”). 
 119 In re Borg-Warner Corp., 101 F.T.C. 863, 910–11 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, Borg-Warner 
Corp. v. FTC, 746 F.2d 108, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 120 Borg-Warner Corp., 101 F.T.C. at 910–11; cf. Murino & Lewis, supra note 101 (recommending 
that companies “be aware if any subsidiaries or affiliates compete with any other entities in which the 
company is also invested”). 
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another corporation merely because its subsidiary operates in the same 
market as the other corporation.121 
Furthermore, in addition to taking action under Section 8, the 
government can target horizontal directors under Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) as an unfair practice or method of 
competition.122 Section 5 provides the FTC with broader power to pursue per 
se violations and activities that violate the spirit rather than the actual letter 
of other provisions of the Clayton Act.123 The FTC sees this as the ability to 
“[p]lug the loopholes in section 8.”124 Notably, the information exchanges 
created by director interlocks have the potential to create anticompetitive 
effects under the Act.125 
Conceptually, antitrust law comes with a strong toolkit for 
enforcement.126 Under Section 8, lack of injury is not a defense,127 and no 
actual effect on prices, company output, or competition is necessary to 
establish liability.128 Enforcement of Section 8 against interlocking 
directorates can be brought by governmental enforcement agencies, state 
attorneys general, and even private parties, as well as the corporation itself.129 
 
 121 See, e.g., Paladin Assocs. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding 
that the parties did not violate antitrust law because they did not possess the power to eliminate 
competition within the market). 
 122  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see, e.g., In re Perpetual Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 90 F.T.C. 608 (1977). 
 123 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (as generally applied to interlocks). 
 124 94 CONG. REC. A112 (1948). 
 125 Laura A. Wilkinson, Interlocking Directorates, PRACTICAL LAW THE JOURNAL, Feb./Mar. 2017, 
at 56, https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/2017/lit_febmar17_spotlighton.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8TA7-LJEV]. 
 126 While the prohibition in Section 8 exempts banks, it does not exempt foreign corporations or 
parents and wholly-owned subsidiaries. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); Timothy Cornell, Don’t Get Tangled Up 
With Interlocking Directorates, CLIFFORD CHANCE 1, 3 (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2013/01/dont-get-tangled-up-
with-interlocking-directorates.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT8F-ZRT8]. In addition, mergers, acquisitions, and 
joint ventures implicate Section 8. For instance, even if two merging entities are not in competition, a 
transacting party who is also the director or officer of a third, competing company would violate Section 
8. Id. at 2. 
 127 Jennifer Coon, Interlocking Directorates, THOMSON REUTERS: LEGAL SOLS. BLOG (Apr. 21, 
2017), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/large-law/interlocking-directorates/ 
[https://perma.cc/KER9-JQZR]; see also Flehner, supra note 25, at 239 (“Section 8, which has been held 
to establish a per se rule of law, was intended to prevent [anticompetitive] effects by automatically 
proscribing certain interlocks, whether or not they actually are proved harmful to competition.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 128 Cornell, supra note 126, at 1. 
 129 Coon, supra note 127; see also Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1973) 
(“[A] corporation has standing to request a federal court to remove a director whose service on its board 
violates an Act of Congress.”). 
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A plaintiff “may obtain an injunction for a Section 8 violation” that includes 
a prohibition on future interlocks.130 Because Section 8 infractions implicate 
Sherman Act liability, private plaintiffs have the potential to seek treble 
damages and attorney’s fees in litigation.131 
Relief can also include removing the interlock, as well as restructuring 
potential transactions to eliminate board seats that enable interlocks or 
require “prior notification or approval provisions” for future positions.132 An 
example of such action occurred in July 2016, when the DOJ required the 
restructuring of a $1.5 billion transaction between Tullett Prebon Group Ltd. 
and ICAP plc so that ICAP would not have an ownership interest in Tullett 
Prebon and could not nominate any Tullett Prebon directors.133 
Furthermore, while a “smoking gun” of a director colluding with 
another company in which she also serves is unlikely, notwithstanding the 
Google–Apple example outlined in Part I, it is also unnecessary. Horizontal 
directors do not have to overtly collude to violate antitrust law. The FTC 
recently demonstrated that anti-competitive effects outside of direct 
coordination could still violate antitrust principles, relying on evidence of 
unilateral effects.134 
2. Fiduciary Duty Law 
Directors, as agents of the corporation-principal, owe a duty of loyalty 
to act for that corporation’s benefit.135 Horizontal directors serving two 
companies operating in the same industry are at a heightened risk of violating 
their fiduciary duties.136 If a director serving on the board of company X is 
exposed to information that may have an impact on company Y, in which 
she also serves as a director, questions arise as to her ability to fulfill her 
fiduciary duties to both companies.137 
 
 130 Coon, supra note 127. 
 131 Cornell, supra note 126, at 2. 
 132 Coon, supra note 127; see also Cornell, supra note 126, at 2. 
 133 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tullett Prebon, supra note 99. 
 134 See, e.g., Scott A. Sher & Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Unilateral Effects in Technology Markets: 
Oracle, H&R Block, and What It All Means, 26 ANTITRUST 46, 46–47 (2012), 
https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/sher-summer-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/75J9-5F5V]; see 
also Competitive Effects, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects [https://perma.cc/C5UU-ETD9]. 
 135 See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 136 See John K. Wells, Multiple Directorships: The Fiduciary Duties and Conflicts of Interest that 
Arise When One Individual Serves More than One Corporation, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 561 (2000). 
 137 Id. at 561–63; see also Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 
54 AM. U. L. REV. 75 (2004) (outlining various situations in which knowledge gained through one 
fiduciary relationship could place the fiduciary in a situation to harm other fiduciary relationships). 
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The conflicts that horizontal directors may be faced with are not unique. 
Delaware law has well-developed caselaw interpreting allegations of 
conflicting loyalties and corporate opportunity violations.138 A key place 
where such conflicts arise is in the parent–subsidiary setting. The facts of 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,139 for example, illustrate the parent–subsidiary 
problem, reaching an outcome and rationale that provides helpful insight into 
Delaware’s approach to horizontal directors. In that case, directors held 
overlapping duties to two entities by virtue of the fact that they sat on the 
boards of both a corporation and its target subsidiary.140 The court declined 
to hold that dual-seated directors were per se conflicted, but found a violation 
of good faith and fair dealing and the “absence of any attempt to structure 
[the] transaction on an arm’s length basis,” and on that basis held the 
directors conflicted.141 
Another related Delaware law doctrine with direct impact on horizontal 
directors is the “corporate opportunity” doctrine. This doctrine has 
developed as a key foundational component of the duty of loyalty.142 Under 
this duty, directors may not take for themselves “a new business opportunity 
that belongs to the corporation, unless they first present it to the corporation 
and receive authorization to pursue it personally.”143 
A series of Delaware cases further delineates the duty of loyalty in the 
context of a corporate opportunity. In the two influential cases of Guth v. 
Loft and Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc., the court examined 
whether (1) the corporation had the resources to carry out the opportunity; 
(2) a similarity existed regarding the line of business; (3) the corporation had 
a “reasonable expectancy” in the opportunity; and (4) by pursuing the 
opportunity personally, the fiduciary would “be placed in a position 
inimicable to his duties to the corporation.”144 
By virtue of serving on boards of companies that operate in the same 
business sphere, horizontal directors are likely to be more vulnerable to 
 
 138 For a recent case explaining and applying this line of case law, see Pers. Touch Holding Corp. v. 
Glaubach, No. 11199-CB, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 66, at *34–49 (Feb. 25, 2019). 
 139 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 140 Id. at 705–09. 
 141 Id. at 710–11. 
 142 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1086 (2017). 
 143 Id. at 1087. 
 144 Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 
503, 511 (Del. 1939). 
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potential duty of loyalty conflicts and corporate opportunity concerns.145 
These directors should, therefore, limit their service on other boards, or at 
the very least restrict their exposure through corporate opportunity 
waivers,146 recusals, and nondisclosure agreements.147 
3. Interlocking Director Committee Limitations 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock 
Market create further restrictions for directors. The NYSE and NASDAQ 
require that a majority of a company’s board of directors be independent.148 
Relevant to horizontal directorships, director independence can depend on 
the director’s or her family members’ service in other companies. For 
example, under NYSE standards, a director is not independent if the 
“director or an immediate family member is, or has been with[in] the last 
three years, employed as an executive officer of another company where any 
of the listed company’s present executive officers at the same time serves or 
served on that company’s compensation committee.”149 Similarly, the 
NASDAQ listing rules state that a director is not independent if the director 
“is, or has a Family Member who is, employed as an Executive Officer of 
another entity where at any time during the past three years any of the 
Executive Officers of the Company serve on the compensation committee of 
such other entity.”150 
Additionally, the NYSE implemented specific rules for simultaneous 
service on multiple audit committees. Namely, Section 303A.07(a) of the 
NYSE Listed Company Manual states that “[i]f an audit committee member 
simultaneously serves on the audit committees of more than three public 
 
 145 See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Tackling the “Evils” of Interlocking Directorates in Healthcare 
Nonprofits, 85 NEB. L. REV. 681 (2007) (discussing the increased potential for fiduciary duty breaches in 
the context of director interlocks in healthcare nonprofits); Wells, supra note 136 (analyzing the fiduciary 
duty conflicts arising out of holding multiple directorships). 
 146 See generally Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 142 (discussing the use of corporate opportunity 
waivers). 
 147 James E. Berchtold, Dual Directorship: The Perils of Serving Two Masters, MARTINDALE (July 
30, 2003), https://www.martindale.com/business-law/article_Lewis-Roca-LLP_22410.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SLK3-LNH7]; Charles M. Nathan, Maintaining Board Confidentiality, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 23, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/01/23/maintaining-board-
confidentiality/ [https://perma.cc/Y4X4-23U3] (explaining the dearth of case law on confidentiality 
requirements of directors and the difficulties in ensuring director confidentiality). 
 148 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745 (Nov. 4, 2003) (approving NYSE § 303A(1) 
& NASD Rule 4350(c)(1)); SEC Approves NYSE and NASDAQ Proposals Relating to Director 
Independence, FINDLAW, http://corporate.findlaw.com/finance/sec-approves-nyse-and-nasdaq-
proposals-relating-to-director.html [https://perma.cc/W7V9-X9GY]. 
 149 N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual (CCH) § 303A.02(b)(iv). 
 150 NASDAQ Stock Mkt. Rules (CCH) 5605(a)(2)(E). 
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companies, the board must determine that such simultaneous service would 
not impair the ability of such member to effectively serve on the listed 
company’s audit committee and must disclose such determination.”151 
Though NASDAQ does not have a comparable rule, in recent years there has 
been a marked drop-off in participation on more than three audit committees 
by directors.152 As Table 1 below demonstrates, the percentage of directors 
serving on the audit committees of more than three boards has declined 
dramatically, going from 8% in 2010 to 1.8% in 2016. 
TABLE 1: AUDIT COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION BY BUSY DIRECTORS 
Audit Participation 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
4+ Boards 8% 9.09% 6.06% 2.90% 2.33% 1.87% 1.80% 
5+ Boards 9.09% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
While these standards may limit some specific cases of horizontal 
directorships, in practice, the complete discretion of the board—as I have 
detailed elsewhere153—to determine that such service would not impair the 
ability of such member to perform her role severely dilutes the effectiveness 
of these stock exchange restrictions. 
4. ISS/Glass Lewis 
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS) and Glass Lewis, the two 
most prominent proxy advisory firms,154 have voting policies requiring 
companies to comply with specific standards in order to obtain the advisory 
firm’s support.155 If management ignores these guidelines, the “proxy 
 
 151 This disclosure can be made “either on or through the listed company’s website or in its annual 
proxy statement or, if the listed company does not file an annual proxy statement, in its annual report on 
Form 10-K filed with the SEC. If this disclosure is made on or through the listed company’s website, the 
listed company must disclose that fact in its annual proxy statement or annual report, as applicable, and 
provide the website address.” N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual (CCH) § 303A.07(a). 
 152 Data was obtained from the BoardEdge database and is valid through June 12, 2017. The 
BoardEdge data file contains various statistics on all public companies in the United States, including 
board committee service. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 153 For a more complete discussion of the problems with the current stock exchange rules, see Yaron 
Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. 
L. 35, 53 (2017) [hereinafter Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind] (reviewing the multiple issues with the 
current reliance on boards to ascertain stock exchange requirements). 
 154 Chester S. Spatt, Proxy Advisory Firms, Governance, Failure, and Regulation, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 25, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/25/proxy-advisory-
firms-governance-failure-and-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/2VSU-9J64]. 
 155 See GLASS, LEWIS & CO., 2017 U.S. POLICY GUIDELINES (2017), 
https://wwxsw.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2017_Guideline_US.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2224-K3JU]; ISS, 2017 U.S. SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES (2017), 
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advisory firms are likely to recommend ‘against votes’ on individual 
directors (or the entire board), and such directors could be subject to potential 
withhold campaigns” and risk being ousted from the board.156 It is no 
surprise, then, that these advisory firms hold significant power vis-à-vis 
companies in regard to their governance and board composition.157 
Both ISS and Glass Lewis have adopted policies providing additional 
boundaries on the service of directors on multiple boards. ISS recommends 
voting against or withholding votes from a director who “sit[s] on more than 
five public company boards” and CEOs who sit on more than two other 
public company boards.158 Glass Lewis will “generally recommend voting 
against a director who serves as an executive officer of any public company 
while serving on a total of more than two public company boards and any 
other director who serves on a total of more than five public company 
boards.”159 
These standards likely increase the pressure on firms to reduce the 
number of busy directors, including horizontal directors. While they only 
serve as an outer limit on extreme cases of horizontal directorships and are 
unlikely to curb a large percentage of the cases, these standards still have an 
impact. As Part II will demonstrate, the ratio of horizontal directors 
dramatically increases as they serve on more boards. Therefore, limiting—
even modestly—the number of boards on which a director can hold a 
position has a stronger impact on those directors that have horizontal 
directorships. 
5. Disclosure Rules 
Finally, the SEC imposes disclosure requirements on publicly traded 
companies in regard to their independent directors. Under Item 407 of 




 156 Yaron Nili & Kobi Kastiel, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail 
Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 76 (2016); see Yonca Ertimur et al., Board of Directors’ 
Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 56, 64 
(2010); Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 2016 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 60, 128. 
 157 See Timothy M. Doyle, New Report: Proxy Advisory Firms Operate with Unchecked Power, 
AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION (May 1, 2018), http://accf.org/2018/05/01/outsized-
influence-minimal-oversight-new-accf-report-finds-that-proxy-advisory-firms-operate-with-unchecked-
power/ [https://perma.cc/EMV3-DVAZ]. 
 158 ISS, 2017 U.S. SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES, supra note 155, at 16. 
 159 GLASS LEWIS & CO., 2017 U. S. POLICY GUIDELINES, supra note 155, at 1, 7–8. 
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been determined to be independent by the board of directors.160 Companies 
must also disclose any non-independent members of the compensation, 
nominating, or audit committees.161 And lastly, if any company has adopted 
its own director independence standards, in addition to the existing stock 
exchange rules, the company must disclose whether its own definition of 
“independence” is available online.162 
Alongside the director independence disclosure requirements, 
companies are required to provide general information on their directors. 
Notably, Item 401(e)(2) requires companies to “[i]ndicate any other 
directorships held, including any other directorships held during the past five 
years, held by each director.”163 Thus, Items 401 and 407 collectively require 
companies to disclose which directors are considered independent and to 
detail each director’s position on the board and any directorships held over 
the past five years. 
 
*          *          * 
 
In sum, boards play a pivotal role not just within a single corporation 
but also within society, and directors concurrently serving on multiple boards 
present several governance benefits and challenges. While a growing body 
of scholarship has focused on the “busyness” element of director 
interlocks,164 this Part has identified a salient subgroup of busy directors—
horizontal directors—and has detailed how the regulatory framework 
regarding these directors may differ from the calculus concerning other non-
horizontal busy directors. 
II. HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This Part provides a comprehensive empirical overview of the 
prevalence and attributes of horizontal directors in the United States, as well 
as data regarding the information that companies divulge to investors on 
horizontal directors. Section II.A begins by introducing the methodology for 
collecting the empirical data on horizontal directors. It then presents the 
 
 160 Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a) (2012). Companies usually satisfy the Item 407 
requirements by including the disclosures within their annual proxy statement or annual 10-K. NYSE and 
NASDAQ rules also effectively defer to Item 407 for disclosure. See N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual 
(CCH) § 303A.02(a); NASDAQ Stock Mkt. Rules (CCH) 5605(b)(1). 
 161 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a). 
 162 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a)(2). If the internal standards are available online, the site must include a 
hyperlink for shareholders to access. Id. 
 163 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e)(2). 
 164 See supra Section I.B. 
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empirical findings on individual horizontal directors. Next, the Section turns 
to an analysis of the companies and industries that tend to have a higher 
concentration of horizontal directors, and finally the Section addresses the 
tendency of horizontal directors to serve on specific board committees in the 
same industry. Next, Section II.B provides an empirical examination and 
analysis of companies’ disclosure practices regarding horizontal directors. 
The Section begins by introducing the methodology for collecting the 
empirical data on companies’ disclosures. The Section then provides data on 
the disclosure practices regarding horizontal directors’ concurrent service. 
Next, the Section reviews the disclosure practices regarding directors’ past 
service, and finally it concludes by providing data regarding the overall 
clarity of companies’ disclosures. 
A. Horizontal Directors in S&P 1500 Companies 
1. Methodology 
This Part examines horizontal directors’ participation on boards in the 
same industry for the S&P 1500 companies from 2010 through 2016. The 
data for this sample was originally compiled from Equilar’s BoardEdge 
dataset.165 The data included detailed information regarding each director 
serving in each of the S&P 1500 companies’ boards for each year, including 
director-level data (age and gender), company-level data (SIC, market 
size,166 and other company financials), and data specific to the director-board 
level (dates of tenure, leadership roles, committee service, shares held, and 
other compensation metrics167). The original data also contained information 
on directors’ service on other public companies not in the S&P 1500. 
These datasets, originally separate, were merged to create one dataset 
at the director-company-year level where each case describes a director’s 
service on a specific S&P 1500 board, plus the additional cases where the 
same directors served on companies not in the S&P 1500. The data were 
subsequently augmented with company-level data from FactSet and the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Association to add 
NAICS codes168 as well as industry classifications for groups of SIC and 
 
 165 See EQUILAR, https://www.equilar.com/boardedge-issuers.html [https://perma.cc/2VJU-778B]. 
 166 Market capitalization was measured in thousands of dollars as reported at the end of the calendar 
year. 
 167 The analysis of director compensation below examines total compensation (measured in log 
dollars), the proportion of shares held (modeled as the logit proportion), and the director’s approval vote 
share (modeled as the logit proportion). 
 168 “The North American Industry Classification System is unique among industry classifications in 
that it is constructed within a single conceptual framework. Economic units that have similar production 
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NAICS codes. The data cover fiscal years 2010 through 2016, providing the 
ability to measure the change of any given variable throughout the study 
period. 
Directors were coded as “horizontal” using four classifications: whether 
a director served on more than one board in the same (1) SIC code, (2) SIC 
industry, (3) NAICS code, and (4) NAICS industry. Using both SIC and 
NAICS classifications allows for two different methods of classifying 
industries and therefore provides a more complete and robust analysis. For 
each of these four classifications, directors are given a binary variable (0 or 
1) indicating their horizontal status and a variable counting the number of 
horizontal boards on which the director served in that year. Because an 
“industry” contains multiple SIC codes or NAICS codes, the industry-
horizontal classifications are a broader measure than the classifications based 
on specific SIC or NAICS codes. In addition to horizontal status, directors 
are coded with their “busy” status—serving on more than one board at a time, 
regardless of whether those boards are horizontal—with an indicator variable 
as well as a count of the total number of boards on which they serve in that 
year. 
2. Director-Level Analysis 
To begin, a large number of directors serve on more than one board. 
Table 2 provides data on the number and percentage of directors in the S&P 
1500 who served on more than one board. It shows that each year from 2010 
to 2016, more than 30% of all directors sat on more than one board. That 
number has remained relatively constant over time, ranging between 36.4% 
in 2010 to 34.8% in 2016. While most busy directors hold only one other 




processes are classified in the same industry, and the lines drawn between industries demarcate, to the 
extent practicable, differences in production processes. . . . In the design of NAICS, attention was given 
to developing production-oriented classifications for (a) new and emerging industries, (b) service 
industries in general, and (c) industries engaged in the production of advanced technologies.” OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM (2017), https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5FNS-XM86]. 
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TABLE 2: NUMBER OF BOARDS A DIRECTOR SITS ON 




 65.14% 22.44% 9.08% 2.66% 0.52% 0.10% 0.04% 100.00% 




 63.75% 23.49% 9.05% 2.92% 0.59% 0.13% 0.07% 100.00% 




 63.55% 23.37% 9.22% 2.83% 0.79% 0.18% 0.07% 100.00% 




 63.31% 23.28% 9.78% 2.70% 0.70% 0.17% 0.07% 100.00% 




 63.92% 23.24% 9.40% 2.44% 0.78% 0.14% 0.07% 100.00% 




 64.23% 23.25% 9.11% 2.44% 0.75% 0.19% 0.03% 100.00% 




 63.63% 23.41% 9.20% 2.68% 0.74% 0.30% 0.03% 100.00% 
7564 2783 1094 318 88 36  4 11,887 
Within this group, horizontal directors constitute a significant number 
and percentage of busy directors. Tables 3 and 4 below reveal a key insight: 
horizontal directors are not a subset of outliers among directors of public 
companies. Indeed, they are quite common. In 2016, there were 2,180 
directors (49.7% of the directors serving on more than one board) who served 
on boards of at least two companies in the same industry (per SIC-Industry 
classification).169 While industry classification is broader than a single SIC 
code, as it combines several SIC codes, under both metrics the number of 
horizontal directors is substantial. In fact, 499 directors (11.3% of the 
directors serving on more than one board) served on at least two companies’ 
boards with the same four-digit SIC code in 2016.170 The results remain 
similar when using the NAICS classification instead of the SIC code, as 369 
directors (8.4% of the directors serving on more than one board) served on 
at least two companies’ boards with the same NAICS code. In other words, 
a large percentage of directors who serve on more than one board do so at 
companies within the same industry. 
  
 
 169 Since the results for the Industry-NAICS classification are very similar to the Industry-SIC 
classification, this Article will provide only the Industry-SIC classification in the analysis. The complete 
results including the Industry-NAICS classification are on file with the author. 
 170 There is an average of 5 companies in each SIC code, with a high of 117 and a low of 1. See data 
on file with the author reviewing the SIC distribution. 
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TABLE 3: NUMBER & PERCENTAGE OF BUSY DIRECTORS  
SHARING AN INDUSTRY WITHIN BOARDS SERVED 
# of 
boards 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 




























































































TABLE 4: NUMBER & PERCENTAGE OF BUSY DIRECTORS  




NAICS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
2 
SIC 140 (5%) 149 (5%) 180 (6%) 183 (6%) 195 (7%) 208 (8%) 209 (8%) 
NAICS 104 (4%) 120 (4%) 144 (5%) 155 (5%) 165 (6%) 159 (5%) 147 (5%) 
3 SIC 
101 
(9%) 103 (9%) 123 (11%) 139 (12%) 129 (11%) 148 (13%) 150 (13%) 
NAICS 80 (7%) 81 (7%) 99 (9%) 118 (10%) 115 (10%) 129 (11%) 132 (12%) 
4 
SIC 45 (14%) 43 (15%) 53 (18%) 70 (21%) 68 (19%) 85 (25%) 102 (29%) 
NAICS 36 (11%) 40 (14%) 41 (14%) 57 (17%) 65 (18%) 62 (17%) 56 (17%) 
5 
SIC 21 (24%) 19 (21%) 28 (29%) 28 (33%) 31 (31%) 24 (32%) 26 (39%) 
NAICS 14 (16%) 14 (16%) 28 (29%) 23 (27%) 23 (23%) 19 (26%) 24 (36%) 
6 
SIC 13 (36%) 8 (35%) 9 (53%) 8 (38%) 13 (59%) 9 (56%) 10 (77%) 
NAICS 13 (36%) 10 (43%) 7 (41%) 5 (24%) 11 (50%) 7 (44%) 8 (62%) 
7+ SIC 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 5 (62%) 7 (78%) 6 (67%) 4 (44%) 2 (40%) NAICS 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 5 (62%) 6 (67%) 5 (56%) 3 (33%) 2 (40%) 
Total 
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The numbers and percentages of horizontal directors are striking, with 
nearly all busy directors on five or more boards sharing at least one industry, 
approximately 80% of busy directors on four boards sharing an industry, and 
more than 60% of directors on three boards sharing an industry amongst their 
boards. Even in the narrower four-digit SIC code or individual NAICS, the 
number of horizontal directors is sizable. 
These findings are particularly alarming against the backdrop of 
existing antitrust regulation detailed above. Because two companies within 
the same industry, or narrower SIC/NAICS classification, present a higher 
likelihood of competition concerns, the large presence of horizontal directors 
is especially peculiar. 
Table 5 further shows that the number and percentage of horizontal 
directors has been trending upwards over time. For example, in 2010, 2.7% 
of the directors in the S&P 1500 sat on at least two boards in the same SIC 
code, and in 2016 their percentage rose by 44% to 3.9%. A similar rise was 
observed under the NAICS classification, as their percentage out of busy 
directors rose by 47% over the seven-year period, from 5.7% to 8.4%. 
 
TABLE 5: TIME TREND OF HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry 2003 2032 2130 2253 2276 2218 2180 
SIC 321 322 398 435 442 478 499 
NAICS 248 265 324 364 384 379 369 
% of Industry-Horizontal 
Directors out of All Directors 16.9 17.1 17.6 18.2 18.2 17.8 17.3 
% of Industry-Horizontal 
Directors out of Busy 
Directors 
46.3 47.7 48.7 49.7 49.8 49.1 49.7 
% of SIC-Horizontal 
Directors out of All Directors 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.9 
% of SIC-Horizontal 
Directors out of Busy 
Directors 
7.4 7.6 9.1 9.6 9.7 10.6 10.9 
% of NAICS-Horizontal 
Directors out of All Directors 2.1 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.1 3 2.9 
% of NAICS-Horizontal 
Directors out of Busy 
Directors 
5.7 6.2 7.4 8 8.4 8.4 8.4 
That same pattern of growth is also reflected in the industry 
measurement, albeit in smaller magnitude. The trend is particularly 
pronounced within SIC/NAICS. Figure 1 below illustrates that the 
percentage of busy directors who sit on companies with the same SIC code 
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has been rising, particularly among directors serving on three or more 
boards. 
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF BUSY DIRECTORS SITTING ON AT LEAST TWO BOARDS WITH THE 
SAME SIC CODE 
 
Regarding the specific attributes of horizontal directors, as Appendix A 
details, a regression analysis shows that horizontal directors are more likely 
to be men and are less likely to be the most tenured directors.171 They are also 
less likely to serve on more board committees compared to their peers.172 
However, CEOs are more likely to serve as horizontal directors if they serve 
on a second board173—which is somewhat surprising, due to competition 
concerns within the same industry. Horizontal directors earn slightly less 
direct compensation compared to non-horizontal directors, with their 
compensation reduced further with each additional board they sit on.174 
Interestingly, however, horizontal directors earn more compared to peer 
directors.175 This indicates the possibility that these directors are valued for 
the competitive advantage that their service provides to their horizontal 
companies.176 Finally, when serving on three or more boards, horizontal 
directors garner less support from shareholders compared to other 
 
 171 See infra Appendix A, Tables 1, 2. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. Tables 3, 4. 
 175 Id. Tables 3, 4. 
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directors.177 Yet, interestingly, when serving on two boards, they garner 
stronger support than their non-horizontal peers.178 
3. Company-Level Analysis 
To fully understand the role and impact of horizontal directors, it is also 
necessary to examine the companies on which they serve. Shifting the 
spotlight to the companies in which horizontal directors serve enables us to 
fully contextualize the impact that horizontal directors may have. 
In doing so, several important observations are worth noting. First, the 
percentage of companies with at least one horizontal director is substantial. 
As Table 6 below indicates, in 2016, a vast majority of companies (81.1%) 
had at least one industry-horizontal director on their board and 26.8% of the 
companies had at least one director who served on boards of two or more 
companies within a single SIC code. Significantly, the percentage of 
companies having at least one horizontal director increased between 2010 
and 2016, reaching its highest point in 2016, when this study concluded. 
Moreover, a substantial percentage of companies have more than one 
horizontal director. In 2016, 2.5% of the companies in the sample had two 
or more industry-horizontal directors and 10.6% had two or more SIC-
horizontal directors (9.1% for NAICS). Here too, the percentage of 
companies with two or more horizontal directors increased between 2010 
and 2016. Under either measure, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the percentage of industry-horizontal directors, SIC-
horizontal directors, NAICS-horizontal directors, and year.179 
  
 
 177 See infra Appendix A, Tables 5, 6. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Appendix A, Figure 1. 
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TABLE 6: INDUSTRY-HORIZONTAL, SIC-HORIZONTAL, AND  
NAICS-HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS, BY YEAR180 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry-Horizontal Directors 
Companies with at least 1 
Horizontal Director 80.3% 79.3% 80.8% 82.5% 82% 81.6% 81.1% 
Companies with 2 or more 
Horizontal Directors 61% 62.3% 62.4% 64% 63.8% 62% 62.5% 
Avg. # of Horizontal 
Directors per Board 2.51 2.52 2.6 2.71 2.73 2.7 2.64 
Avg. proportion of Horiz. 
Directors on the Board 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 
SIC-Horizontal Directors 
Companies with at least 1 
Horizontal Director 22.9% 22.7% 25.3% 26.2% 25.7% 26.6% 26.8% 
Companies with 2 or more 
Horizontal Directors 7.9% 8% 9.6% 10.5% 10.9% 10.3% 10.6% 
Avg. # of Horizontal 
Directors per Board .35 .36 .44 .46 .47 .47 .45 
Avg. Proportion of SIC-
Horiz. Directors .03 .03 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 
NAICS-Horizontal Directors 
Companies with at least 1 
Horizontal Director 17.1% 19.1% 20.9% 22.9% 22.9% 23.% 23.1% 
Companies with 2 or more 
Horizontal Directors 5.8% 6.6% 7.7% 8.5% 9% 8.9% 9.1% 
Avg. # of Horizontal 
Directors per board 0.26 0.3 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 
Avg. proportion of NAICS-
Horiz. Directors .02 .03 .03 .04 .04 .04 .04 
Overall 
Avg. # of total directors on 
a company’s board 10.25 10.24 10.28 10.35 10.44 10.54 10.51 
Total 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 
Table 7 further reflects the prevalence of horizontal directors, with 
many companies having four or more horizontal directors on their board. For 
example, in 2016, 31.5% of the companies in the S&P 1500 had more than 
four industry-horizontal directors. Thirty-one companies (2.1% of the S&P 
1500) had four or more directors that served on the boards of at least two 
companies within the same SIC code. These data again reflect a steady rise 
 
 180 Under the Industry-Horizontal Directors heading, Row 1 presents the percentage of companies in 
each year with at least one industry-horizontal director. Row 2 presents the percentage of companies with 
two or more industry-horizontal directors. Row 3 presents the average number of industry-horizontal 
directors per board (a director who sat on at least one additional board in the same industry). Row 4 
presents the proportion of directors on a company’s board of directors who are industry-horizontal, taking 
into consideration the varying size of companies’ boards of directors. This pattern repeats for SIC-
Horizontal Directors and NAICS-Horizontal Directors. 
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in the number of companies with a high number of horizontal directors 
serving on their board, which parallels the rise in individual horizontal 
directors during the same time period.181 
TABLE 7: PERCENT OF COMPANIES WITH HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS BY YEAR 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Industry-Horizontal Directors 
0 Horizontal Dir. 19.70% 20.70% 19.20% 17.50% 17.90% 18.30% 18.80% 
1Horizontal Dir. 18.30% 16.90% 18.40% 18.50% 18.20% 19.60% 18.60% 
2Horizontal Dir. 18.70% 19.20% 17.20% 16.70% 16.30% 16.30% 17.40% 
3Horizontal Dir. 14.60% 14.80% 15.60% 14.20% 14.00% 13.90% 13.60% 
4+Horizontal Dir. 28.70% 28.50% 29.60% 33.10% 33.50% 31.80% 31.50% 
SIC-Horizontal Directors 
0 Horizontal Dir. 77.10% 77.20% 74.60% 73.80% 74.30% 73.40% 73.10% 
1Horizontal Dir. 15.00% 14.80% 15.80% 15.70% 14.80% 16.30% 16.30% 
2Horizontal Dir. 4.70% 4.50% 5.20% 5.50% 5.60% 5.30% 6.10% 
3Horizontal Dir. 2.00% 2.50% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80% 2.90% 2.40% 
4+Horizontal Dir. 1.30% 1.00% 1.60% 2.30% 2.60% 2.30% 2.10% 
NAICS-Horizontal Directors 
0 Horizontal Dir. 82.80% 80.80% 79.00% 77.10% 77.00% 76.90% 76.80% 
1Horizontal Dir. 11.30% 12.50% 13.20% 14.40% 13.90% 14.10% 14.00% 
2Horizontal Dir. 3.60% 3.60% 4.30% 4.40% 5.00% 4.60% 5.40% 
3Horizontal Dir. 1.50% 2.20% 2.30% 2.50% 2.20% 2.70% 2.10% 
4+Horizontal Dir. 0.80% 0.90% 1.20% 1.60% 1.80% 1.60% 1.70% 
Of course, not all industries are created equal. As Table 8 shows, some 
industries are more prone to having horizontal directors than others. While 
the Construction industry had, on average, 10.7% industry-level horizontal 
directors serving on two or more companies’ boards, the Manufacturing 
industry had 33.7%.182 Likewise, in Finance and Real Estate, more than 7% 
of the horizontal directors served on the boards of two or more companies in 
the same SIC, while only 2.7% were present on two or more boards in the 
same SIC in the Retail and Trade industry. 
  
 
 181 See supra Section II.A.2, Table 5. 
 182 An important caveat should be noted: the number of companies in each industry varies 
significantly and could skew the results in industries with a small number of companies, such as the 
Agriculture segment. 
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TABLE 8: AVERAGE PERCENT OF HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS BY INDUSTRY/SIC 
  2010 2016 



















Industry 10.4% 1.2 9 4.8% 0.66 3 SIC 2% 0.22 0.00% 0.00 




Industry 17.2% 1.87 
264 
18.8% 2.03 
300 SIC 5.8% 0.53 7.2% 0.65 
Manufacturing Industry 33.7% 3.47 551 33.7% 3.57 561 SIC 3.7% 0.34 4.3% 0.43 
Mining Industry 20.7% 2.13 58 25% 2.36 69 SIC 5.5% 0.51 8.8% 0.79 
Retail Trade Industry 18.4% 1.89 128 21.8% 2.35 114 SIC 1.8% 0.17 2.7% 0.26 
Services Industry 20.8% 2.04 210 20.6% 2.16 199 SIC 3.9% 0.37 3.6% 0.36 
Transportation, 
Communications 
Industry 18.4% 2.13 135 19% 2.22 140 SIC 2.4% 0.29 3.9% 0.45 
Wholesale Trade Industry 14.6% 1.57 47 15.7% 1.67 49 SIC 1.3% 0.14 1.3% 0.14 
 
The differences go beyond the industry. Even within a single industry, 
certain SICs are more prone to having horizontal directors than others. Table 
9 lists the SIC codes that had the highest average percentage of horizontal 
directors. For example, in the SIC for Cable & Other Pay Television 
Services, close to 20% of the directors were serving on two companies’ 
boards. In comparison, none of the directors was horizontal in the similarly 
sized Life Insurance SIC.183 
  
 
 183 See SIC data on file with author. 
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TABLE 9: SIC CODE “REPEAT OFFENDERS”184 
Industry-Horizontal SIC-Horizontal Both 
SIC 
Code SIC Description  
SIC 
Code SIC Description  
SIC 
Code SIC Description  




3630 Household Appliances 6798 Real Estate Investment Trusts  4922 
Natural Gas 
Transmission 










2810 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals 7373 
Computer Integrated 










3829 Measuring & Controlling Devices 3674 
Semiconductors & 




Finally, as Table 10 shows, many of the SIC codes with high horizontal 
directorship levels also exhibit a high level of industry concentration. If 
horizontal directors do indeed allow for data flow, their antitrust impact 
would be strongest in concentrated industries that require fewer companies 
to coordinate in order to achieve anticompetitive practices.185 
 
 184 Table 9 presents the SIC codes with the highest average percentage of horizontal directors, but 
excludes SIC codes comprised of only one company to avoid skewing the data, because SIC codes with 
only one company cannot have horizontal directors within that SIC code. 
 185 Because concentration is a proxy for competition, a highly concentrated industry faces less 
competition. See supra note 98. The effects of this concentration are exacerbated if the few competing 
firms are disincentivized to compete because of their shared directors. See, e.g., Michael E. Jacobs, 
Combating Anticompetitive Interlocks: Section 8 of the Clayton Act as a Template for Small and 
Emerging Economies, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 643, 644 (2014) (“[S]erious risks can arise when interlocks 
involve competitors because of their potential to facilitate collusion or otherwise contribute to the 
establishment or maintenance of tacit or oligopolistic coordination.” (citation omitted)). 
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4 Largest Firms as 
% of Total 
Shipments187 
8 Largest Firms as 
% of Total 
Shipments188 
2844 325611 37.97 5 70.1 80.5 
3711 336111 36.19 6 60.2 88.7 
3823 334513 33.95 8 33.2 40.9 
3714 336310 32.81 13 49.8 66.7 
3089 326121 32.24 6 29.6 40.1 
2821 325211 32.16 6 34.3 47.2 
3572 334112 31.87 6 75.3 88.0 
2911 324110 31.42 16 46.9 71.7 
3812 334511 30.16 6 54.7 79.7 
Average 33.19 8 50.45 67.05 
4. Committee Work 
Though boards meet regularly, often seven to nine times per year, each 
board also delegates key roles to specialized committees that meet frequently 
in addition to the all-board meetings.189 All publicly traded companies must 
maintain three primary committees, including an audit committee, the 
nominating and corporate governance committee, and the compensation 
committee,190 though boards frequently choose to delegate powers to 
additional committees, including, for example, executive committees, 
finance committees, and compliance committees.191 Required or not, 
committees carry significant power to make important decisions on behalf 
of the board regarding their specific mandates.192 In fact, at least one study 
 
 186 The top industry-horizontal SIC codes are measured based on the percentage of companies that 
have at least one horizontal director. 
 187 Data on file with author and based on data from the 2012 Economic Census of the United States. 
See AMERICAN FACTFINDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/ 
searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t#none [https://perma.cc/ADS2-X6VJ].  
 188 Id. 
 189 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 61, at 28–29 (for example, in 2019, boards met an average of 
8.2 times). 
 190 Nili, Beyond the Numbers, supra note 63, at 154; see also SPENCER STUART, supra note 61, at 
29. 
 191 Steve W. Klemash et al., A Fresh Look at Board Committees, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (July 10, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/10/a-fresh-look-at-board-
committees/ [https://perma.cc/9JMR-UV3M]. 
 192 David A. Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees 
and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 396, 400 (2010) (“Evidence supports the idea 
that many important decisions are made in board committees and those decisions affect the performance 
of the firm.”); Idalene F. Kesner, Directors’ Characteristics and Committee Membership: An 
Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure, and Gender, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66, 67 (1988) (examining 
the characteristics of directors on the board committees “that are typically the most influential and 
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has found that over half of “outside directors” meetings take place at the 
committee level.193 
Because of the important roles committees play in board decisions, 
directors serving on these committees wield significant power within the 
board.194 As such, accounting for a director’s specific board committee 
membership provides a more accurate picture of the director’s influence on 
the board. As noted in Part I, NYSE recognizes this potential by adopting a 
requirement that a board must determine and disclose that a board member’s 
concurrent service on three audit committees would not impair her ability to 
effectively serve on the company’s audit committee.195 In the context of 
horizontal directors, service on similar board committees across companies 
may heighten the benefits and risks that these directors pose. Not only are 
these directors privy to specific information, they may also be better 
positioned to influence corporate policy compared to directors who are not 
serving on these committees. 
Table 11 reveals that over 21% of the horizontal directors serving on 
two boards in the same SIC served on the audit committee of both boards. 
Similarly, among the horizontal directors who served on three boards in the 
same SIC, 17.8% served on the audit committee of all of their boards. 
Director overlap in the other two key committees was also substantial. 
TABLE 11: HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS’ COMMITTEE SERVICE ACROSS BOARDS (2016) 
Committee Horizontal Directors 
Serving on 2 Boards in 
Same SIC 
Horizontal Directors Serving 
on 3 Boards in Same SIC 
Audit (2+) 21.9% 28.5% 
Compensation (2+) 19.1% 21.4% 
Governance (2+) 19.9% 28.5% 
Audit (3) — 17.8% 
Compensation (3) — 0% 
Governance (3) — 14.2% 
 
powerful”); April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 279 
(1998) (examining firm performance through the lens of board committees). 
 193 Renée B. Adams et al., Death by Committee? An Analysis of Corporate Board (Sub-) Committees 
1, 3 (Dec. 23, 2018), http://www.tumarkin.net/papers/Death_by_Committee.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X3MA-Q2VK]. 
 194 Nili, Beyond the Numbers, supra note 63, at 154–55. 
 195 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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B. Disclosure Practices 
As shareholder engagement with, scrutiny of, and influence on 
companies is on the rise,196 the disclosure of board positions enables 
investors to better monitor and influence companies regarding board 
composition, including horizontal directorships. To be sure, companies vary 
in their disclosure of relevant data on horizontal directors. Yet, current 
disclosure practices generally lack several elements that would give 
shareholders access to better information about horizontal directors. 
1. Methodology 
This Section utilizes a hand-collected dataset to analyze the disclosure 
statements of one hundred public companies for the year 2016. Fifty of the 
companies make up the Fortune 50, and the remaining fifty are Russell 2000 
small-cap companies. This design is intended to examine both large-cap, 
marquee companies as well as some small-cap, less visible public 
companies. 
For each company, information regarding each director was collected 
from the company’s 2018 form DEF 14A—an annual proxy filing required 
by the SEC. The information collected from these statements included 
whether each company indicated the director’s service in other companies, 
whether the company identified these companies by name, whether the 
company identified the industry of these other companies, whether the 
information provided was only concurrent or also past-looking, whether the 
company included a numerical count, and whether the company had any 
disclosed restrictions on service on other boards. Below are the findings 
regarding horizontal directorship disclosure, past directorships disclosure, 
and overall clarity of the disclosure of other board positions. 
2. Information on Intra-Industry Directorships 
Of the hundred companies surveyed, ninety-nine had directors that 
participated on other boards at the time of the disclosure. One did not. Of 
those ninety-nine companies, ninety-eight disclosed each of these additional 
directorships, while one company only partially disclosed other concurrent 
directorships.197 
 
 196 Tom Johnson, Shareholder Engagement: An Evolving Landscape, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Mar. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/09/shareholder-engagement-an-
evolving-landscape/ [https://perma.cc/B5FM-W64M]; see also Kastiel, supra note 156, at 130–31; Nili 
& Kastiel, supra note 156, at 75–83 (noting the increasing importance of shareholder votes against a 
backdrop of the effect of individual retail investors’ apathy). See generally Ertimur et al., supra note 156; 
Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Influence, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2179 (2014) 
(showing the disciplining effect of shareholder proposals on managers). 
 197 A list of the companies is on file with the author. 
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Of the ninety-nine companies that recognized other directorships in 
some form, ninety-six of them named all of the other companies where the 
director served. Yet, only twenty-one of the ninety-nine proxy statements 
identifying other directorships provided a description of the other company 
or at least identified the industry in which the other company participated. 
The remaining seventy-eight did not disclose this information. 
This practice may help camouflage the presence of horizontal directors 
on the board, as in many cases it will not be immediately clear to 
shareholders whether the additional board positions a director holds share an 
industry/SIC. 
3. Information on Past Directorships 
Relatedly, disclosure rules only require companies to disclose prior 
directorships for the past five years.198 The social and professional ties that a 
director cultivates while on a company’s board, however, often endure for 
much longer than five years.199 Thus, lack of information on all past 
directorships is a cause for concern. 
Indeed, a review of companies’ disclosure statements from 2016 reveals 
that many companies only disclosed the minimum that was required of them. 
While ninety-three proxies disclosed past directorships in addition to current 
directorships, only thirty-two of the companies surveyed disclosed 
information about directorships that terminated more than five years prior. 
Another fifty-two companies met the minimum requirements, only 
disclosing other directorships from the past five years. The remaining nine 
 
 198 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 199 See Theo Francis & Joann S. Lublin, Boards Get More Independent, but Ties Endure, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 19, 2016, 3:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boards-get-more-independent-but-ties-endure-








Industry of Other Directorships Identified?
Yes No N/A
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provided no time frame to contextualize identified past directorships. 
Interestingly, seven companies were noncompliant and disclosed no 
information about past directorships, and one company disclosed 
information only on select past directorships.200 
4. Clarity of Disclosure and Presentation 
Some proxy statements made it clear that their directors served on the 
boards of other companies by displaying charts or setting this information 
apart from the typical paragraph describing a director’s qualifications. 
Organized tables including a director’s title, age, committee memberships, 
and other directorships are an easy way to enhance transparency of the board 
to shareholders and potential investors. For instance, General Motors 
presented the following easy-to-digest format in its 2016 proxy materials:201 
General Motors is not an outlier. Of the companies surveyed, forty-one 
disclosed other directorships in a similar manner.202 Still, a majority of the 
 
 200 Previous work has also found that companies have been skirting their current disclosure 
obligations in various ways. See Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 153, at 64–68; Nili, Successor 
CEOs, supra note 51, at 803–04 (finding that companies did not meet disclosure requirements regarding 
chair independence in many cases). 
 201 General Motors Company, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 15 (June 7, 2016). 





Identifies More Than Past Five Years
Yes
No
No exact time frame given
No past information given
at all
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companies (59%) did not, instead choosing to include the information within 
a descriptive paragraph, if at all.203 Fourteen proxies provided a summarized 
numerical count of the other directorships of their directors, while eighty did 
not, and two companies provided none at all.204 
This survey demonstrates that companies vary in their disclosure of 
directors’ board positions, both in content and in form. Moreover, as this 
survey reveals, the majority of companies do not provide pertinent 
information on the horizontal directorships of some of their board members, 
and in many cases the mandated regulatory information is presented in an 
opaque manner. Finally, larger companies do not appear to do better 
compared to smaller companies, and the inconsistency is observed across 
industries.205 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS 
As the data demonstrate, the prevalence of directors serving on 
companies within the same industry is on the rise, and the current regulatory 
framework does little to prevent this rise despite the existing prohibition on 
horizontal directors’ service on two competitors’ boards. This gap between 
the current regulatory framework’s failure to address horizontal directors in 
a meaningful way and the increasing prevalence of horizontal directors poses 
an important question: How should we understand and view this rise in the 
prominence of horizontal directors? This Part will contextualize the 
empirical data relayed in Part II by first discussing the key findings and then 
analyzing both the benefits and drawbacks of horizontal directors. 
A. Key Lessons from the Findings 
Several broad observations can be drawn from the empirical findings. 
First, both in absolute numbers and as percentages, horizontal directors 
represent a considerable share of the directors in S&P 1500 companies. Not 
surprisingly, when measuring horizontal directorship under the broader 
“industry” standard, the number of horizontal directors was substantial, with 
industries such as Manufacturing having an average of over three horizontal 
directors per company in 2016.206 But, even under the more conservative 
SIC-code measure, the number of horizontal directors was significant, both 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 A complete analysis based on industry and company size is on file with the author. 
 206 See supra Section II.A.3, Table 8. 
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as a portion of the busy directors group and as a portion of the entire director 
pool. 
Second, and even more importantly, the number and percentage of 
horizontal directorships rose substantially during the time period studied, 
with 81.1% of companies having at least one industry-horizontal director in 
2016.207 Under all three metrics (industry, SIC, and NAICS), the relative 
share of horizontal directors increased over time, reaching its highest level 
in 2016, the last year sampled. 
Third, more companies added horizontal directors to their boards 
between 2010 and 2016, and more companies had a “critical mass” of 
horizontal directors on their board during that period.208 Some industries and 
SIC codes are more prone than others to having horizontal directors, and 
some highly concentrated industries also display high levels of horizontal 
directorships. Furthermore, many horizontal directors serve on the same 
board committee on all of their horizontal boards, magnifying both the 
benefits and concerns they may present, as outlined below. This is especially 
highlighted in industries and SIC codes that exhibit a higher number of 
horizontal directors who can facilitate the flow of information among the 
companies they serve. 
The data also reveal that while companies’ disclosure practices 
regarding horizontal directors vary, many only disclose the minimum 
information required. Few companies disclose previous directorships held 
more than five years ago, and fewer yet disclose information regarding the 
industry or SIC of concurrent directorships held by their board members. 
This leaves shareholders in the dark about the true prevalence of the 
horizontal directors serving on the boards they elect. 
Finally, a key lesson from the data is a more nuanced taxonomy of 
horizontal directors, allowing for a more nuanced discussion of the potential 
benefits and drawbacks of horizontal directors. The empirical findings reveal 
that horizontal directors can be divided into four distinct categories. First, 
there are directors who serve on boards of two competitors as defined in 
Section 8 of the Clayton Act, and therefore are in violation of antitrust law.209 
Although it may not be immediately clear which companies qualify as 
 
 207 See supra Section II.A.3, Table 6. 
 208 Critical mass is often mentioned in the context of diversity. See, e.g., Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 
Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. 
J. SOC. 965, 965–66 (1977) (“Proportions, that is, relative numbers of socially and culturally different 
people in a group, are seen as critical in shaping interaction dynamics . . . . [W]ith a ratio of perhaps 
65:35, dominants are just a majority and . . . [m]inority members . . . can affect the culture of the group.”). 
One can think that boards that reach a similar critical mass of horizontal directors may also experience 
heightened influence by that group of directors. 
 209 See supra note 105. 
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competitors and which do not, the data have shown that many companies in 
the same line of business, as defined by their SIC/NAICS designation, do 
share directors. In that sense, companies that operate in the same industry 
(and especially in the narrower SIC/NAICS) are more likely to be considered 
competitors under Section 8. 
Second, there are directors who serve on boards of companies within 
the same SIC/NAICS which would not qualify as competitors under Section 
8. These directors still have the potential to bring about many of the same 
antitrust and corporate governance concerns as those in direct violation of 
Section 8, whether or not they are defined as competitors. 
Third, there are directors who serve on boards of companies within the 
same industry but not within the same SIC/NAICS, and who do not qualify 
as competitors under Section 8. Not surprisingly, this group encompasses 
more directors, as the larger industry demarcation lines incorporate several 
SIC/NAICS. While these directors may be at a lesser risk of violating Section 
8, the broad reading of “competition” in the context of Section 8, the spirit 
behind it, and the fact that these directors are within the same industry could 
still lead to heightened governance concerns about practices that cut against 
the purpose and policy of antitrust regulation. 
Fourth, there are directors who serve on boards of “mega” corporations 
such as Amazon, Apple, Alphabet (Google), and Facebook, where they do 
not even operate within the same defined industry, but because of the 
massive span and reach of these companies, the lines of traditional industries 
have become blurred. Competition may still arise out of these blurred lines, 
and the current regulatory framework does not have the mechanisms to 
address directors serving horizontally in this line of competition.210 
B. The Double-Edged Case for Horizontal Directors on Corporate Boards 
The prevalence of directors serving on several boards has led to an 
active debate regarding the desirability of busy directors,211 but the specific 
case of horizontal directorship adds an additional layer to this ongoing 
debate. Does industry concentration of directors provide value, and if so, to 
whom? Alternatively, what specific concerns may horizontal directorships 
present? The following Sections outline the potential benefits and concerns 
horizontal directorship may entail. 
 
 210 Cf. Debbie Feinstein, Have a Plan to Comply with the Bar on Horizontal Interlocks, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2017/01/have-
plan-comply-bar-horizontal-interlocks [https://perma.cc/8JLS-3ZL5] (“The [FTC] has generally relied 
on self-policing to prevent Section 8 violations . . . .”). 
 211 See, e.g., Ljungqvist & Raff, supra note 7. 
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1. The Interlock Dimension 
Research shows that director interlocks can enhance both negative and 
positive practices in corporate governance. Among the positive effects, 
director interlocks contribute to the diffusion of beneficial corporate 
governance practices, and horizontal directors are in an optimal position to 
spread these beneficial practices. Studies find that more director interlocks 
on a board are linked to more accurate financial reporting and a reduced 
likelihood of misstating annual results,212 as well as a higher likelihood of 
adopting conservative tests for goodwill impairment,213 the nomination of a 
high proportion of independent directors,214 and the separation of the roles of 
the CEO and the chairman of the board.215 These practices are highly praised 
by proxy advisory firms like ISS and Glass Lewis, as they are more likely to 
protect investors from misaligned management.216 Interlocks have also been 
found to spread legal innovation, even in an otherwise information-rich 
environment.217 “In fact, recent evidence suggests that the effect of interlocks 
on the spread of good governance practices might be larger than their effect 
on the spread of bad ones.”218 
Among the negative impacts, however, studies indicate that interlocks 
have contributed to the diffusion of option backdating,219 more liberal use of 
 
 212 Thomas C. Omer et al., Do Director Networks Matter for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence 
from Audit Committee Connectedness and Restatements, MGMT. SCI. 1, 1 (2019), 
https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3331 [https://perma.cc/8XDW-FNAX] 
(finding that companies with more-connected directors are less likely to misstate their annual results). 
 213 See Marcy L. Shepardson, Effects of Individual Task-Specific Experience in Audit Committee 
Oversight of Financial Reporting Outcomes, 74 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 56 (2019).  
 214 See Christa H. S. Bouwman, Corporate Governance Propagation Through Overlapping 
Directors, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2358, 2358–59, 2361 (2011) (finding that “[f]irms that are networked 
through overlapping directors tend to adopt similar governance practices,” such as nominating 
independent directors). 
 215 See id. The separation of the roles is indeed a good governance practice. See, e.g., Nili, Successor 
CEOs, supra note 51, at 813 (explaining that separating the role of CEO and chairman allows an 
independent chair with a fresh perspective to make positive changes). 
 216 See GLASS LEWIS, 2020 Proxy Paper Guidelines: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to 
Proxy Advice, 5–6 (2019), https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Guidelines_US.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FTX9-KSBY]; ISS, United States Proxy Voting Guidelines, 19–20 (2018), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/744Q-FB8B]. 
 217 See Barzuza & Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate Governance, supra note 15, at 685–86; 
Barzuza & Curtis, Outside Directors’ Protection, supra note 8, at 129–31. 
 218 Barzuza & Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate Governance, supra note 15, at 672. 
 219 John Bizjak et al., Option Backdating and Board Interlocks, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4821, 4826, 4845 
(2009) (reporting that 80% of the firms in their sample shared at least one director and that “results 
indicate that board interlocks appear to be an important factor in facilitating the spread of [backdating of 
option grants]”). 
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earnings management,220 and the increased spread of poison pills.221 A 
particular subset of interlocks known as “reciprocal interlocks,” which are 
between top executives who serve on each other’s boards, has attracted 
special attention.222 Reciprocal interlocks between CEOs, for example, are 
associated with worse performance and less efficient compensation, 
potentially due to a “back-scratching” effect.223 
The interlock dimension raises several concerns in the context of 
horizontal directorship. First, data flow between companies in the same 
sphere may lead to antitrust concerns of collaboration and collusion. Second, 
interlocks may increase the concern of systemic governance risk. Third, 
interlocking within an industry may place director independence at 
heightened risk. 
a. Antitrust Concerns: Collaboration and Collusion 
Given that collaboration between firms within an industry can be 
beneficial to both firms and consumers, antitrust laws only target the subset 
of collaborative efforts that lead to anticompetitive outcomes.224 This type of 
anticompetitive collaboration is often termed collusion.225 
Horizontal directors may facilitate, or unintentionally contribute to, 
both collaboration and collusion between the companies whose boards they 
serve on. This phenomenon may be especially prevalent in industries that are 
more saturated with horizontal directors, such as within the manufacturing 
industry.226 Even in cases where the companies are not direct competitors and 
therefore are not prohibited from having horizontal directors by Section 8 of 
 
 220 See Peng-Chia Chiu et al., Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion, 88 ACCT. 
REV. 915, 916 (2013). 
 221 Gerald F. Davis, Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the 
Intercorporate Network, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583, 606 (1991) (“These results provide . . . support for the 
interorganizational hypotheses for when and why firms would adopt poison pills.”). 
 222 Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, Why Do CEOs Reciprocally Sit on Each Other’s Boards?, 
11 J. CORP. FIN. 175, 176 (2005) (noting the development of new information on reciprocal CEO 
interlocks). 
 223 See Fich & White, supra note 62, at 952–53; Kevin F. Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards 
of Directors and Executive Compensation, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 331, 332, 343 (1997) 
(finding that interlocking CEOs have an incentive to raise each other’s pay, which is associated with a 
lower measured return). 
 224 See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 2–3 (Apr. 2000), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-
guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEN5-MWLV] 
[hereinafter FTC–DOJ COLLABORATION GUIDELINES]. 
 225 See, e.g., id. at 15. 
 226 See supra Section II.A.3, Table 8. 
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the Clayton Act, companies in the same industry and business environment 
may benefit from direct and indirect collaboration or collusion.227 For 
instance, horizontal directors may facilitate a flow of information that allows 
both companies they serve to better coordinate at the expense of suppliers 
and consumers.228 
The Justice Department itself has indicated that horizontal directorships 
may facilitate “a cozy relationship among competitors,”229 prompting them 
to coordinate at the expense of consumers. Yet, the same potential “cozy 
relationship” that raises antitrust concerns may actually benefit the 
shareholders of these companies, allowing them to increase profits by having 
consumers pay more, therefore making horizontal directorships a rational 
and legitimate corporate governance choice for companies.230 
These benefits of collusion are externalized onto consumers and 
suppliers in what the literature views as an inefficient tradeoff.231 
Additionally, horizontal directorships that enable industry coordination, if 
not outright collusion, also reduce the market’s monitoring of management. 
The takeover market serves as a disciplining force, as the threat of being 
taken over by another company and losing their executive positions may 
incentivize managers to improve company performance.232 If companies are 
able to coordinate through horizontal directors within that industry, they may 
be less likely to engage in horizontal mergers and acquisitions, and therefore, 
 
 227 See FTC–DOJ COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 224, at 6; Gregory T. Gundlach & Jakki 
J. Mohr, Collaborative Relationships: Legal Limits and Antitrust Considerations, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 101, 107 (1992).  
 228 See, e.g., Sher & Murino, supra note 134, at 46–47; Competitive Effects, supra note 134. 
 229 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tullett Prebon, supra note 99. 
 230 See infra notes 288–289 and accompanying text. 
 231 Not every coordination is detrimental. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tullett Prebon, 
supra note 99, at 1 (“In order to compete in modern markets, competitors sometimes need to 
collaborate. . . . Such collaborations often are not only benign but procompetitive.”). However, 
coordination that leads to price increases and cartels is problematic. See generally Edward J. Green et al., 
Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L ANTITRUST ECON. 464–97 (Roger 
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015) (discussing tacit and explicit coordination); Margaret Levenstein 
& Valerie Suslow, Cartels and Collusion—Empirical Evidence (Univ. of Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 1182, 2012), https://ssrn.com/a=2182565 [https://perma.cc/GAQ4-BGZM] 
(discussing the “wide variety of techniques that cartels use to increase prices and profits”). 
 232 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 
57 BUS. LAW. 1047 (2002) (criticizing state laws that “excessively protect incumbent managers from 
takeovers”); William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for 
Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y, 13, 16 (2000) (“[I]n the 1970s, agency theorists argued that 
there was a need for a takeover market that, functioning as a market for corporate control, could discipline 
managers whose companies performed poorly.”). 
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such horizontal companies are not as scrutinized by the takeover market as 
they otherwise would have been. 
In the merger context, an increased risk of “coordinated, 
accommodating, or interdependent behavior among rivals,” deemed 
“coordinated effects,” can be anti-competitive.233 Similarly, recent antitrust 
enforcement of mergers has focused less on market-definition anti-
competitive behavior and more strongly on competitive effects.234 According 
to the 2010 DOJ–FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, “A merger may 
diminish competition by enabling or encouraging post-merger coordinated 
interaction among firms in the relevant market that harms customers.”235 A 
horizontal director could be rationally incentivized to act for both firms in a 
way that could encourage coordinated effects. Such incentives could be 
considered “parallel accommodating conduct,” which “includes situations in 
which each rival’s response to competitive moves made by others is 
individually rational, and not motivated by retaliation or deterrence nor 
intended to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless 
emboldens price increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce 
prices or offer customers better terms.”236 
Horizontal directors may also increase the risk of anticompetitive 
effects through rationally coordinated behavior without any inkling of 
merger between the two firms. In these cases, the focus would shift from 
looking for actual illegal communications between directors to questioning 
whether companies were conscious of each other’s conduct and whether that 
knowledge was an element in their decision-making.237 Horizontal board 
positions reduce the information gap between firms responding to a price 
change or other competitive initiative238 and accordingly could serve as a 
vessel for conveying these illegal communications. 
 
 233 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2 (Aug. 
2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7B43-T6JT] [hereinafter DOJ–FTC HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
 234 Sher & Murino, supra note 134, at 47; see also United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 
2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that the court must rigorously analyze the efficiencies of post-merger 
behavior, and the merging parties must demonstrate how the “merged firm’s ability and incentive to 
compete” would be achieved through the merger). 
 235 DOJ–FTC HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 233, at 24. 
 236 Id. at 24–25. 
 237 Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1235–36 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(finding that from recorded statements between two industry players, “a jury reasonably could conclude 
that Hendricks, acting on behalf of Moyer, was attempting to get the Ryders to play by the industry rules 
and that Moyer was part of an agreement among some renderers”). 
 238 DOJ–FTC HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 233, at 24–25, 34. 
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Finally, if horizontal directors facilitate anticompetitive practices that 
are aligned with shareholders’ interests, they may also help managers 
insulate themselves from market pressure. A less competitive environment 
may lead to a lower likelihood of takeover and to lower share price pressure 
on the company. The diminished efficacy of these market forces in 
disciplining management may lead to underachievement and loss of 
shareholder value in the long term, and this may prove especially 
problematic in industries that have a higher prevalence of horizontal 
directors. 
b. Systemic Governance Risk 
If directors facilitate the transfer of best practices from one corporation 
to another, they may also contribute to the standardization of policies and 
control and compliance mechanisms amongst companies, therefore reducing 
the differences in controls and procedures between corporations.239 While the 
adoption of best practices would often lead to better overall governance 
practices, it is also important to consider the increased exposure of the 
industry to what could be termed systemic governance risk. Systemic risk in 
the financial context is the concern that an event at the company level could 
trigger severe instability or collapse an entire industry or economy. But an 
industry-wide risk could also stem from governance practices. For instance, 
uniformity in governance procedures, through the adoption of similar 
governance arrangements, may form a “weak spot” in corporations’ 
compliance or other best practices that could lead to a cascade of similar 
issues across corporations.240 
The presence of horizontal directors further exacerbates this concern, 
as industry coordination and the sharing of controls and compliance methods 
may increase the exposure of that specific industry to systemic governance 
risk, macro legal risk, or industry-wide operational risk.241 Of course, 
horizontal directors may also lead their companies to adopt similar business, 
financing and capital structure, and operational decisions, therefore also 
contributing to industry-wide business and financial risks.242 
 
 239 Cf. Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate Compliance 9–10 
(Working Paper, 2019), https://ssrn.com/a=3194605 [https://perma.cc/L9U8-5HS4] (discussing 
information-sharing and improved compliance in the context of common ownership). 
 240 See Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 216 (2019) (“Despite the focus 
by regulators and prosecutors on the importance of developing an effective compliance program, it is 
commonly understood that it would be inefficient for firms to strive to obtain ‘perfect’ compliance.”). 
 241 See id. at 218–19; cf. Eckstein, supra note 239, at 34–35. 
 242 “Business risk is the possibility that an organization’s operations or competitive environment will 
cause it to generate financial results that are worse than expected. Financial risk is the possibility that the 
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c. Director Independence 
Director interlocks, especially horizontal director interlocks, may also 
influence the independence of directors. Indeed, I have already questioned 
whether busy directors fulfill the director independence requirements of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the stock exchanges.243 The 
ability of directors to serve on multiple boards, and the financial and 
reputational rewards that come with a board position,244 have made many 
directors opt to become full-time directors, making service on multiple 
boards their main line of employment.245 The desire to secure more board 
positions, and to maintain the positions currently held, can lead directors to 
be less willing to confront management or to be perceived as “difficult.”246 
Since management controls the nomination process, maintaining a reputation 
as a “pro-management” director becomes an important factor in the 
likelihood of securing additional positions.247 Horizontal directors, who serve 
on multiple companies’ boards within the same industry, may become even 
more complacent with management. For instance, alienating one 
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 243 See Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 153, at 60. 
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L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/26/does-the-
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 246 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
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Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 
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O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1245 (2003) (discussing 
the board’s contribution to Enron’s failure). 
 247 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 
17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 12 (2005) (stating that “developing a reputation as a director who blocks 
compensation arrangements sought by executives can only hurt a director’s chances of being invited to 
join other boards”); Miriam Schwartz-Ziv & Michael S. Weisbach, What Do Boards Really Do? Evidence 
from Minutes of Board Meetings, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 349, 359 (2013) (analyzing board minutes of Israeli 
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ultimately voted with management); Cassandra D. Marshall, Are Dissenting Directors Rewarded? 2 (Ind. 
Univ. Kelley Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=1668642 
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management team could more readily lead to a negative reputation within 
the industry and to a loss of the other horizontal directorships. 
That said, directors assuming more than one board position may also 
contribute to director independence. Interlocks allow directors to diversify 
their risk and to potentially become more independent because of their 
decreased reliance on one position alone.248 In addition, horizontal directors 
serving on multiple boards within the same industry may hold outside, 
independent positions that help them in monitoring management.249 
2. The “Busyness” Dimension 
Horizontal directors do not only pose unique questions in the context of 
the two specific companies in which they serve, i.e., the interlock dimension. 
They also pose unique benefits and concerns in the broader context of 
director busyness. This Section underscores the impact that the horizontal 
aspect has on the busy director dimension. 
a. Expertise and Connections 
While the question of whether busy directors add or detract value may 
also depend on external circumstances,250 horizontal directors are at the 
extreme end of this value-adding feature. By sitting on boards of multiple 
companies in the same industry, they presumably gain “a profound 
knowledge of the specific industry in which they serve.”251 Their intimate 
knowledge of the industry’s specific dynamics, as well as the key players 
and institutional history, may increase these directors’ understanding of the 
various strategic prospects and competitive threats that the company faces.252 
Hence, horizontal directorships can be a valuable asset to a director’s ability 
to advise and monitor the management team.253 
However, a horizontal director’s institutional knowledge and 
understanding may not always be beneficial. For instance, a horizontal 
director’s attempts to import one firm’s culture and strategy to the other 
without considering cultural and other differences across the firms may be 
 
 248 Nili, New Insiders, supra note 50, at 141. 
 249 See Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 153, at 45–46. 
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concluded that during the Great Recession, a rise in director busyness improved firm value, while outside 
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harmful.254 Horizontal directors may also be bound by confidentiality 
agreements that could prevent them from sharing or even supporting 
beneficial strategies because the peer firm previously implemented them.255 
Essentially, horizontal directors’ conflicts of interest may negate the value 
those directors bring, or at least prevent them from fully realizing the value 
that they could bring. 
b. Board Composition 
When the same director serves on many boards, often for long terms,256 
it creates a spillover effect on board composition. Because the overall 
number of board seats is limited, directors taking multiple openings directly 
limit the ability of professionals without prior board experience to enter the 
board club.257 When directors take several board seats in the same industry, 
the refreshment and diversity concern is amplified.258 Furthermore, when a 
specific industry has a tendency to have horizontal directorships, the industry 
may be also, in itself, less diverse, and suffer from board composition issues 
that may have a negative impact on firm governance. 
c. Director Compensation 
While directors receive a portion of their compensation in the form of 
a cash fee, many also receive a significant portion of their compensation in 
the form of stock option grants and restricted stock units (RSUs).259 
Companies use equity to pay directors in an effort to decrease the agency 
costs between the shareholders and their elected directors.260 In theory, 
directors with stock or stock grants are more likely to align their goals with 
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those of shareholders and to attempt to maximize shareholder returns.261 
Importantly, while director compensation is modest compared to CEO 
compensation,262 it is still substantial. A director in an S&P 500 company 
earns, on average, $304,856 a year, with over 60% coming from equity.263 
Over a normal tenure, a director may build an equity stake of around $4.5 
million in each of her companies. 
However, stock grants in the context of busy directors also raise 
concerns that busy directors will not remain completely loyal to the best 
interests of any one company in which they serve.264 Therefore, such busy 
directors perhaps will not make decisions based solely on projected 
performance of any specific company they serve on, but rather as a function 
of their total equity portfolio, which includes all of the companies in which 
they hold stock through their directorships.265 For example, if a director 
knows that a strategic decision to enter into a new product line or acquire 
another company will be detrimental to a competing company in which she 
also serves, and that competing company makes up a larger portion of her 
equity portfolio, she may be less inclined to support such a decision. On the 
other hand, if she knows that a decision may be more beneficial to one of her 
portfolio companies as opposed to the specific board she is sitting on, she 
may be more inclined to vocally suggest or support such a decision, despite 
the best interests of each company’s shareholders. Moreover, directors are 
often required to hold their equity in the companies in which they serve as 
directors for the duration of their service and often longer, preventing them 
from avoiding this conflict altogether.266 
This concern is not limited to horizontal directors—any director is able 
to hold stock in other companies by purchasing shares on the open market. 
However, horizontal directors do present an added complexity. Because 
corporate decisions are more likely to have a direct impact on other 
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companies in the same industry, directors who either currently sit or have 
previously sat on other boards within the same industry may face more 
situations where a decision of board A would have an impact on the stock of 
the industry competitor, company B, on which they also serve. In these cases, 
the equity holdings of horizontal directors play an unwanted role in their 
decision-making. 
C. Horizontal Directors: Contrasting the Law with the Data 
Antitrust law prohibits horizontal directorships in competing 
corporations. Yet, despite this prohibition, a significant number of directors 
serve on boards in the same industry, even narrowly defined. While industry 
measures, even as narrow as the NAICS and SIC classifications, are only a 
crude proxy for the potential of two companies to compete, it is nevertheless 
more likely that two companies operating in the same space will be 
considered competitors. This is especially true under the wide definition of 
competition that has been applied to Section 8.267 So how can one explain 
this disparity? 
There are several key factors that could explain the rise of horizontal 
directors against this regulatory backdrop. First, it could indeed be that 
horizontal directors do not serve on boards of competitors at all and therefore 
are not in violation of Section 8. As advanced in this Article, this seems 
improbable due to the wide definition of competitors for Section 8 purposes 
on the one hand, and the use of the narrow SIC/NAICS to estimate 
horizontalness on the other. Recall that Section 8 applies to “companies that 
vie for the business of the same prospective purchasers, even if the products 
they offer, unless modified, are sufficiently dissimilar to preclude a single 
purchaser from having a choice of a suitable product from each.”268 Yet, 
importantly, even if none of the 499 directors serving on two or more 
companies in the same SIC code is in direct violation of Section 8, one has 
to ask whether the spirit and concerns behind Section 8 are still evident in 
these cases of horizontal directors. 
Second, while Section 8 is technically a strict liability offense,269 several 
barriers, both practical and structural, hinder its enforcement, potentially 
leading to the pervasiveness of horizontal directors. From a practical 
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perspective, the remedy for an interlock in violation of Section 8 is simply 
an injunction removing the interlock.270 However, historically, the FTC and 
the DOJ have not brought Section 8 enforcement actions in court,271 but 
instead have relied on self-policing and behind-the-scenes actions to pressure 
violators.272 Indeed, by the FTC’s own admission, the most frequent remedy 
is a board member’s resignation of her own accord upon announcement of 
an investigation.273 
As explained in Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley: 
The national government rarely sues under § 8. . . . When the Antitrust Division 
or the FTC concludes that directorships improperly overlap, it notifies the firm 
and gives it a chance to avoid litigation (or to convince the enforcers that the 
interlock is lawful). For more than 30 years, this process has enabled antitrust 
enforcers to resolve § 8 issues amicably—either avoiding litigation or entering 
consent decrees contemporaneous with a suit’s initiation.274 
Additionally, while technically possible, private enforcement by 
shareholders is relatively uncommon compared to other areas of shareholder 
litigation275 and, according to precedent, faces long odds to succeed. In 2012, 
shareholders of Sears accused the corporation of a Section 8 violation when 
two of its directors held seats at AutoZone, AutoNation, and Jones Apparel. 
Ostensibly, these directorships conflicted with Sears’s auto and clothing 
lines.276 Following the directors’ reelection to the board in 2009, shareholders 
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of Sears filed a derivative action which accused the corporation of violating 
Section 8. However, the Seventh Circuit rejected their suit.277 The court’s 
decision exhibited no empathy for a suit whose sole purpose was, allegedly, 
to “cram unnecessary litigation down the throats of firms whose directors 
serve on multiple boards, and then use the high costs of antitrust suits to 
extort settlements (including undeserved attorneys’ fees) from the targets.”278 
Underlying the Seventh Circuit’s decision was the fact that investors “did 
not make a demand on the directors before filing suit,” and investors did not 
suffer an antitrust injury because they stood to gain from cooperation with 
competitors.279 
From a structural perspective, the lack of remuneration to a private 
plaintiff bringing a claim may disincentivize individual shareholders from 
doing so, especially if horizontal directors advance shareholder value. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, information regarding horizontalness is not 
easily available to shareholders.280 
The lack of clarity regarding competition and the discretionary power 
given to the FTC in applying the “competition” requirement regarding 
horizontal directors may also contribute to the low enforcement rates of 
Section 8 against horizontal directors. Current antitrust regulation focuses on 
direct competition,281 and while direct competition can be obvious, 
oftentimes it is not. Where the market in which a company is situated is 
unclear, the concept of competition could be problematic for directors 
serving on multiple companies’ boards. As companies like Apple, Google, 
and Amazon increasingly expand into new markets, some argue that the 
current antitrust framework fails to account for the realities that currently 
exist with technology companies.282 In fact, critics argue that companies such 
as Facebook and Amazon limit competition even where, for instance, the 
target of an M&A transaction does not directly compete with the acquirer.283 
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For example, after Amazon’s announcement of its acquisition of Whole 
Foods, other grocers, such as Walmart, saw their stock prices drop.284 Under 
the current regulatory scheme, this transaction did not involve two 
competitors and therefore did not violate anticompetitive regulations. The 
drop in stock price, however, suggests that the market sees Amazon as a 
company that is disrupting the grocery market, which could potentially 
implicate future antitrust concerns. Similarly, this argument suggests that 
companies who historically have not been competitors may share directors, 
but in the case of an acquisition or expansion into a new market, these types 
of companies may raise the same antitrust concerns that traditionally focused 
on true competitors. Presumably, if Amazon and Walmart shared a director, 
this would violate at least the spirit of the law. 
In sum, Section 8 lacks a bright-line-rule understanding of the 
“competitors” prerequisite. Additionally, the enforcement of Section 8 
involves discretion, negotiations, and amicability, as well as a lack of 
publicity. The lack of a clear and public enforcement process adds a layer of 
difficulty in projecting FTC/DOJ enforcement and in deterring companies 
from violating Section 8 ex ante. Against this regulatory backdrop, one must 
query whether the concentration of directors within an industry may create a 
prima facie concern of a violation of Section 8. This in turn may require the 
FTC and consumers to conduct further analysis of the market shares and 
actual products sold by companies with busy directors in order to establish 
Section 8 liability. 
IV. ADDRESSING HORIZONTAL DIRECTORS 
As noted, serving on the boards of two competitors is prohibited by 
Section 8 of the Clayton Act. Yet, as discussed above, interpretation and 
enforcement of Section 8 has left gaping gray zones. Even if Section 8 were 
uniformly and diligently enforced, it does not regulate horizontal 
directorships involving two companies that operate in the same industry or 
SIC unless they are considered direct competitors. Furthermore, horizontal 
directorships outside of Section 8’s scope still raise significant antitrust and 
corporate governance concerns.285 
The increased prevalence of horizontal directors, generally, within 
industries, and within a single SIC/NAICS code, as documented in Part II, 
indicates that while other governance mechanisms—including state law, 
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exchange rules, and shareholders’ guidelines—may limit some instances of 
horizontal directorships beyond the scope of Section 8, they are far from an 
effective constraint on the pervasiveness of horizontal directors. The 
increased prevalence of horizontal directors, coupled with the evolution of 
mega-corporations that span multiple industries and an ill-equipped antitrust 
framework, necessitates a reevaluation of the regulatory policy governing 
horizontal directors. 
This Part delineates the potential policy implications that stem from the 
prominence of horizontal directors within public firms in the U.S., drawing 
upon the tension created by the unique benefits and concerns these directors 
present to investors, consumers, and regulators as outlined in Section III.B. 
It then turns to potential avenues for reform. First, legislative and regulatory 
reforms to Section 8 could help address the anticompetitive ramifications of 
horizontal directors. Second, to address horizontal directorships that do not 
fall within Section 8’s terms but may still present corporate governance 
concerns, I argue that an improved disclosure regime may be warranted. 
Finally, private ordering may present a way forward to accomplish both 
better disclosure and private enforcement of Section 8. 
A. Implications and Limitations 
As a starting point, it is important to underscore that the policy 
implications relating to horizontal directors are difficult to untangle. 
Moreover, policy is driven, at least to some extent, by the general view that 
regulators and investors currently hold on horizontal directorship, which 
naturally reflects the tug-of-war between the concerns that horizontal 
directors pose and the benefits they provide. 
Recognizing that horizontal directors stand at the intersection of 
corporate governance and antitrust law also means that any individual policy 
reform must identify whether its focus lies with anticompetitive concerns or 
corporate governance motivations. While addressing antitrust concerns 
places the focus mainly on consumer welfare286 without regard to the 
company or its investors, corporate governance considerations focus on 
maximizing the value of the corporation.287 Policy reform, therefore, must 
balance these competing constituencies’ interests. 
Specifically, shareholders may actually value the anticompetitive 
advantages horizontal directors provide to their companies at the expense of 
consumers, as well as the corporate governance benefits of industry expertise 
horizontal directors bring to the table. These benefits may very well 
 
 286 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 287 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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outweigh the concerns in shareholders’ minds of systemic governance risk, 
reduced independence, and monitoring. Conversely, regulators focusing on 
consumer welfare may find the costs of collusion, combined with the 
potential governance concerns, sufficiently high to merit limitations on 
horizontal directors, notwithstanding benefits to shareholders. 
For example, in Crowley, the Seventh Circuit focused solely on 
corporate governance discourse to evaluate a horizontal director case. In 
rejecting the suit, the court relied on both procedural288 and normative 
governance considerations, focusing on the costs to shareholders and musing 
that investors stood to gain if the competitors cooperated, setting aside 
competing antitrust concerns.289 
It is clear that, as a matter of the law on the books, allowing direct 
competitors to collude through the use of horizontal directorships violates 
antitrust laws. But how should we approach the other categories of horizontal 
directors? Do we regulate all horizontal directors? Some? And if so, what 
means should regulators and legislators use to address these concerns? 
Should they expand and tighten Section 8 to address the systemic prevalence 
of horizontal directors within the same industry or SIC, even if they do not 
qualify as competitors under the current statutory scheme? Or should 
regulators tailor their approach based on the category of horizontal directors 
and use approaches outside of the statutory prohibition to address horizontal 
directors of noncompeting companies? Crucially, how should regulators and 
investors balance the potential hazards of horizontal directorship with the 
value that horizontal directorship can provide to companies from a corporate 
governance perspective?290 
A nuanced approach to the issue of horizontal directors should be 
prioritized. Rather than categorically restricting horizontal directorships or 
ignoring them altogether, regulators should focus on means that maximize 
the perceived benefits of these directors while minimizing the potential 
 
 288 Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley, 687 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing the failure of the 
plaintiffs to meet the procedural requirement of making a demand of directors before filing suit as one 
reason for dismissing the lawsuit). 
 289 Id. at 317, 319–20 (“Plaintiffs say that investors still can gain from this suit, because removing 
interlocking directors from the board will eliminate any chance that the United States will file a § 8 suit 
to remove them. We don’t get it. In order to avoid a risk of antitrust litigation, the company should be put 
through the litigation wringer (this suit) with certainty! How can replacing a 1% or even a 20% chance 
of a bad thing with a 100% chance of the same bad thing make investors better off? . . . If the Antitrust 
Division or the FTC sees a problem, there will be time enough to work it out. Derivative litigation in the 
teeth of the demand requirement and the antitrust-injury doctrine is not the way to handle this subject.”). 
 290 Wolfgang Drobetz et al., supra note 69, at 195 (analyzing “the valuation effect of board industry 
experience and channels through which industry experience of outside directors” affects firm value, and 
finding that “firms with more experienced outside directors are valued at a premium”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1242 
concerns. In doing so, identifying which of the four aforementioned 
categories a horizontal director falls into291 and how the benefits and costs 
balance out within that category would play a pivotal role. 
B. Antitrust Reform 
The potential “evils” of centralization that antitrust law seeks to remedy 
are apparent in the horizontal director context.292 If directors serve competitor 
companies, even under a broader definition of competition,293 they may 
facilitate coordination between competitors to the detriment of consumers. 
Indeed, the intent of Section 8 was to “nip in the bud incipient violations of 
the antitrust laws.”294 
Yet, the current regulatory framework is both over- and underinclusive. 
On the one hand, the Clayton Act prohibits horizontal directors among 
competitors. On the other, it does not provide any regulation of horizontal 
directors of noncompetitors. In addition, the enforcement and interpretation 
of Section 8’s competition requirement are not uniform.295 
Moreover, the focus on competition and antitrust concerns, as the sole 
lens through which the regulation of horizontal directors is currently 
 
 291 The four categories are: (1) directors who serve on boards of two competitors as defined in Section 
8; (2) directors who serve on boards of companies within the same SIC/NAICS which would not qualify 
as competitors under Section 8; (3) directors who serve on boards of companies within the same industry 
but not within the same SIC/NAICS, and who do not qualify as competitors under Section 8; and (4) 
directors who serve on boards of “mega” corporations. See supra text accompanying notes 209–210. 
 292 In explaining how interlocking directorates are “the root of many evils,” Louis Brandeis described 
“The Money Trust,” a conglomeration of J.P. Morgan & Co. and its various trust companies that held 341 
director seats in 112 corporations whose total assets exceeded $22 billion. EARL W. KINTNER ET AL., 
5 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 42.1 (2019) (citing LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW 
THE BANKERS USE IT 35 (1914) and 3 VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION 
§ 20.01 (1976)); see also BRANDEIS, supra, at 28–37, 51 (1914). A modern comparison may be found in 
that BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street “are the single largest shareholder in almost 90% of S&P 500 
firms.” Jan Fichtner et al., These Three Firms Own Corporate America, CONVERSATION (May 10, 2017), 
http://theconversation.com/these-three-firms-own-corporate-america-77072 [https://perma.cc/ZDY3-
Q64Z]; see also Elhauge, supra note 22, at 1268 (citing Neil Stewart, Retail Shareholders: Looking Out 
for the Little Guy, IR MAG. (May 15, 2012), https://www.irmagazine.com/shareholder-targeting-id/retail-
shareholders-looking-out-little-guy [https://perma.cc/U4L2-DEJU]). 
 293 See infra notes 114–116 and accompanying text. 
 294 United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
 295 See, e.g., Benjamin M. Gerber, Enabling Interlock Benefits While Preventing Anticompetitive 
Harm: Toward an Optimal Definition of Competitors Under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 24 YALE J. 
REG. 107, 118–24 (2007) (examining the unclear and inconsistent findings of the courts regarding Section 
7’s relation to Section 8); John T. Murray, The Definition of Competitors Under Section 8 of the Clayton 
Act: The Emergence of Supply Side Competition Analysis, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135, 137–38 (1984) 
(arguing that the courts have been inconsistent in selecting a standard that determines whether two 
corporations are competitors). 
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examined, leaves behind the myriad other governance benefits and concerns 
that horizontal directors present.296 
Legislative and regulatory reforms must not only address the issues 
raised by the current formulation of the Clayton Act, but should also address 
the greater governance ecosystem of horizontal directors. Below, this Article 
discusses some of the potential avenues regulators might consider in 
addressing the issue. First, regulators can amend the Clayton Act to better 
balance the corporate governance benefits and costs and the antitrust 
concerns. Second, the FTC could reduce the ambiguity of horizontal 
directors and the definition of competition by a move to an ex ante safe 
harbor approval. Finally, stronger enforcement is needed. 
1. Amending the Clayton Act 
Since horizontal directors may produce both positive and negative 
effects,297 a potential amendment to the Clayton Act or to the interpretive 
regulations must recognize these effects and incorporate provisions that 
provide flexibility. If policymakers decide that antitrust concerns outweigh 
the potential benefits horizontal directorships may provide, particularly in 
the context of directors who serve on competing firms, then the regulatory 
prohibition needs to be revised to include more stringent restrictions, as well 
as better mechanics for enforcement. 
A new regulatory or statutory definition should begin with an 
understanding that not all companies are created equal. While Section 8 
already includes a company size threshold, it does not currently account for 
the type of industry or the concentration level of the market in which the 
company operates. If horizontal directorship is alarming due to collusion 
concerns and an anticompetitive impact on consumers, it becomes vital to 
identify where these concerns are most likely to have a significant effect. 
Indeed, as Part II demonstrated,298 some industries and SICs are more likely 
to have horizontal directors, and some of these horizontal-director-saturated 
industries also exhibit strong levels of industry concentration, perhaps 
making them a key starting point for evaluation. 
Focusing the prohibition on concentrated industries, similarly to the 
way mergers and acquisitions are evaluated based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI),299 might strike a desired balance, allowing 
 
 296 See supra Section III.B. 
 297 See supra Section III.B. 
 298 See supra Section II.A. 
 299 “Since 1982, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and state attorneys 
general have used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market concentration for purposes 
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companies to enjoy the benefits these directors provide while prohibiting 
their presence in cases where the costs to competition are more likely to 
outweigh these benefits. For instance, Section 8 could be revised to exempt 
from the prohibition industries with an HHI that is below a certain threshold. 
2. Ex Ante Approval 
The current regulatory system is designed around an ex post review. If 
the FTC finds that a director is in violation of Section 8, then it may take 
steps to remedy the situation. This design leads to three issues. First, ex ante, 
companies may lack certainty as to whether appointment of a certain director 
would violate Section 8. In other words, companies may not know whether 
a director would be considered to be serving on the board of a competitor. 
This uncertainty may lead companies to refrain from nominating a 
prospective director, or nominate the director but risk a violation of the Act. 
Second, even if a company knows that appointing a director will constitute 
a violation of Section 8, it does not know whether the FTC will choose to 
enforce Section 8, and indeed, often the FTC does not. Third, if the FTC 
were to diligently enforce Section 8, it would have to actively monitor 
director appointments, classify companies as competitors, and enforce 
violations on a consistent basis—placing a costly burden on the FTC. 
Perhaps a more desirable option that regulators could consider is an ex 
ante design to Section 8 of the Clayton Act. Specifically, the FTC could 
allow directors to apply for a waiver before taking a horizontal directorship. 
By obtaining an ex ante “no action”300 waiver from the FTC, companies 
would receive certainty regarding their directors and would be able to justify 
the nomination of directors that would technically violate the Act. It would 
also give the FTC a veto right ex ante, reducing the need for costly ex post 
enforcement. 
In fact, a similar arrangement is already employed in the context of 
interlocking bank directorships. The Federal Reserve’s (the Fed) Regulation 
L is similar to the Clayton Act in that it prohibits an officer or director of any 
 
of antitrust enforcement. The HHI of a market is calculated by summing the squares of the percentage 
market shares held by the respective firms. . . . According to the DOJ–FTC 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, the agencies will regard a market in which the post-merger HHI is below 1500 as 
‘unconcentrated,’ between 1500 and 2500 as ‘moderately concentrated,’ and above 2500 as ‘highly 
concentrated.’” Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Calculator, ANDREW CHIN (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.unclaw.com/chin/teaching/antitrust/herfindahl.htm [https://perma.cc/S8X4-MAVZ]. 
 300 This would be similar to the no-action process employed by the SEC in exclusion of shareholder 
proposals. See Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84 HARV. L. REV. 700, 717 
(1971); SCOTT LESMES, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND 
PROXY ACCESS 1–3 (2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/frequently-asked-questions-about-
shareholder-proposals-and-proxy-access.pdf [https://perma.cc/R99U-GBWR]. 
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bank holding companies with over $10 billion in assets from serving as an 
officer or director of a bank holding company with over $10 billion in 
assets.301 However, the Fed can, and frequently does, grant waivers when it 
determines that an interlock would not substantially lessen competition.302 
The Fed retains authority to revoke a waiver if the interlock later results in 
reduced competition.303 
A system of ex ante review, therefore, would promote the benefits of 
horizontal directorships while preventing problematic interlocks from 
occurring. Of course, to make a waiver process credible, the FTC would 
actually have to prosecute unlawful interlocks and be reasonably responsive 
to companies’ requests. 
3. Stronger Enforcement 
Enforcement of Section 8 of the Clayton Act is at the FTC’s discretion. 
The inherent need for interpretation of the “competitor” requirement allows 
the FTC to effectively refrain from enforcing the Act, or to only do so 
selectively.304 Even when the FTC does enforce Section 8, it often does it 
behind closed doors with no public visibility.305 Thus, revising the 
restrictions on horizontal directorship also requires a more predictable, 
public, and effective enforcement mechanism. 
Assuming that the FTC decides to keep some variant of a prohibition 
on directors serving on two competitors’ boards, then the FTC should hold 
companies and directors accountable for anticompetitive conduct. To do this, 
it is essential that the FTC ensures effective enforcement. This can be done 
by selectively auditing companies, therefore increasing deterrence, or by 
 
 301 12 C.F.R. § 212.3 (2019). 
 302 See, e.g., Letter from Ann E. Misback, Secretary of the Board, to Jason J. Cabral, Esq., Sullivan 
& Cromwell LLP (June 9, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/ 
bhc_changeincontrol20170609b.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WCX-AC3Y]; Letter from Margaret McCloskey 
Shanks, Deputy Secretary of the Board, to Jason J. Cabral, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Sept. 7, 
2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/bhc_changeincontrol20170907.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5PDT-TYHD]; Letter from Margaret McCloskey Shanks, Deputy Secretary of the 
Board, to Patricia M. Schaubeck, Esq., Sun Bancorp, Inc. (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legalinterpretations/bhc_changeincontrol20170414.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EAJ5-LR82]. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Administrative agencies often exercise discretion in their actions. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 
1305–10 (1999) (discussing administrative discretion in the context of antitrust law); Martin Shapiro, 
Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1487–88 (1983) (discussing 
administrative discretion more broadly). 
 305 See supra, notes 271–272 and accompanying text. 
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requiring the filing of the questionnaires that directors provide a company 
when they are considered for nomination, therefore reducing the FTC’s 
information costs and allowing it to better identify cases that merit a closer 
look.306 These mechanisms, however, would not bolster the public visibility 
of the enforcement of Section 8. The FTC’s incentives and decision-making 
when exercising enforcement discretion would still remain opaque. To that 
end, improved disclosure by companies, as discussed below, could allow for 
better public pressure on the FTC in cases where enforcement is absent. 
C. Corporate Governance Reform 
As previously mentioned, horizontal directors toe the line between 
antitrust and corporate governance. The above Section offered several 
suggestions for reframing the current antitrust regulation to highlight the 
benefits of these directors while minimizing their costs from the antitrust 
perspective. A comprehensive reform must also address the corporate 
governance challenges they pose. This Section will first outline the need for 
improved disclosure and then analyze stock exchanges and proxy advisors 
as a potential avenue for reform. 
1. The Case for Improved Disclosure 
Whether viewing horizontal directors as a corporate governance 
liability or as a potential benefit, a strong case for improved disclosure exists 
across different types of horizontal directors. As discussed in Part II, many 
companies disclose the bare minimum required under current applicable 
regulations.307 Companies are not currently required to provide detailed 
information about other companies on which a director serves and are only 
required to provide data for the past five years.308 The lack of sufficiently 
detailed disclosure regarding a director’s other board positions may 
camouflage the presence of horizontal directorships and prevent 
shareholders from easily identifying directors who are horizontal and from 
assessing the potential benefits and costs such directors may present to their 
company. 
Importantly, even if shareholders believe that horizontal directors in 
general are a net benefit, either due to the governance benefits or the 
anticompetitive advantages they enable, they may still want companies to 
properly disclose their presence. Enhanced disclosure would allow investors 
 
 306 See Alan S. Gutterman, Director, Officer and Principal Shareholder Questionnaires—A Primer 
on Contents and Use, FINDLAW, https://corporate.findlaw.com/corporate-governance/director-officer-
and-principal-shareholder-questionnaires-a-pr.html [https://perma.cc/V2K6-3AFY]. 
 307 See supra Section II.B; see also Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 153 (discussing the 
current flaws in the disclosure regime). 
 308 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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not only to affirm the judgment of the board in recommending a director for 
election, but also to possess a better understanding of whether, on net, the 
presence of each individual horizontal director is beneficial to the company. 
The improved information would also enable investors to make more 
informed decisions about specific board recommendations on other matters 
standing for a vote. For instance, shareholders might decide to oppose the 
election of a director if the incremental value she provides is lower than the 
potential costs. Even if the director is elected, shareholders can decide to 
treat further recommendations of the board with increased scrutiny. Such a 
discourse regime will also empower companies to tailor each disclosure to a 
given director’s unique circumstances. 
Therefore, in order to ensure effective disclosure by companies, the 
SEC should make multiple changes to its current rules. For example, it could 
require companies to disclose, for each director, information that would 
allow investors to clearly identify each director’s network of companies. 
Specifically, companies could be required to provide a table containing the 
name, SIC and industry classification, and market cap of each company in 
which the director has served or been an employee, both currently and in the 
past. For horizontal directors, companies would also have to provide explicit 
disclosure regarding the potential competitive risks that the director’s service 
might entail. Similar disclosure practices in the context of director skills 
matrices have already been adopted by companies, allowing investors to 
better ascertain directors’ qualifications.309 These suggestions are a natural 
addition to these matrices. 
2. Stock Exchanges and Proxy Advisors 
An alternative potential avenue for reform would be through stock 
exchanges’ self-regulation. As discussed in Part III, one of the concerns of 
horizontal directorships is the ability of directors to serve as independent 
directors when they are steeped in one industry.310 Accordingly, stock 
exchanges may consider revising their independence definitions to exclude 
directors from being considered independent if they serve on the boards of 
two companies in the same SIC code, whether or not they are considered 
 
 309 See, e.g., Amy Jiang, Hundreds of Companies Disclose Board Skills Matrices, EQUILAR (Apr. 13, 
2017), https://www.equilar.com/blogs/241-hundreds-of-companies-disclose-board-skills-matrices.html 
[https://perma.cc/9VXE-QHWV] (analyzing the most commonly disclosed skills and providing a graphic 
of an exemplar disclosure); Best Disclosure: Director Qualifications & Skills, COUNCIL OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Feb. 2014), https://www.cii.org/files/publications/ 
governance_basics/04_28_14_best_disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BLB-UJ5G] (drawing attention to 
the value of director skill disclosures in a simple and comprehensive manner). 
 310 See supra Section III.B.1.c.  
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competitors. These directors may still serve on these boards, and more 
importantly, they may serve as independent directors on companies outside 
the specific SIC/industry. This restriction could strike the needed balance 
between allowing horizontal directorship and preventing boards and 
directors from becoming too dependent on their specific industry connection. 
Similarly, proxy advisors should address horizontal directors 
specifically. While current voting policies by proxy advisors are directed at 
the broader overboarding concern311 and CEO busyness,312 they have left the 
issues stemming from industry concentration unattended. At the very least, 
proxy advisory firms should require detailed disclosure regarding horizontal 
directors.313 Depending on the proxy advisory firms’ evaluation of the 
benefits and concerns, they may also want to adopt additional restrictions on 
horizontal directorship. 
D. Implementation Through Other Means 
While regulatory reform would be the most straightforward route for 
addressing horizontal directors, Congress, the FTC, and the SEC may be 
unwilling or unable to implement regulations in the near future.314 Yet, 
regulatory intervention, even if preferable, is not the only route through 
which potential reform may be pursued. Companies could adopt better 
disclosure rules and restrictions on horizontal directorships, or similar 
initiatives, on their own through two other means. First, companies may 
voluntarily adopt improved disclosures based on the mounting pressure from 
large investor groups. Second, plaintiffs may use fiduciary law to address 
some of the concerns that horizontal directors present. 
 
 311 Lyuba Goltser & Megan Pendleton, 2017 Proxy Season: ISS and Glass Lewis Update Their 
Voting Policies, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/30/2017-proxy-season-iss-and-glass-lewis-update-their-
voting-policies/ [https://perma.cc/238M-QCG9] (discussing ISS and Glass Lewis overboarding policies). 
 312 Joann S. Lublin, Are Executives Overboarded?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 29, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204778604577243573205924302 
[https://perma.cc/2PH8-VLM7]; Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, CEO “Overboarding” Continues to Be Key 
Area for Investors, S&C DEALPORTAL (Nov. 30, 2017), https://scdealportal.sullcrom.com/posts/ceo-
overboarding-continues-to-be-key-area-for-investors/ [https://perma.cc/E4GC-SYTP]. 
 313 See supra Section II.B. 
 314 The current administration has publicly called for reducing regulation. See Ted Gayer et al., 
Evaluating the Trump Administration’s Regulatory Reform Program 3, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/evaluatingtrumpregreform_gayerlitanwallach 
_102017.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTL5-8R5D]. 
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1. Organic Growth and Shareholder Proposals 
ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s voting policies,315 as well as institutional 
investors’ policies, could cause companies to organically move towards 
better disclosure and policing of horizontal directors, with minimum 
regulatory burdens and without rapid shocks. 
Shareholder proposals can harness these policies, implementing them 
in specific companies. Shareholder proposals allow shareholders to bring 
specific matters that relate to the company’s governance and other significant 
issues to a vote at the company’s annual meeting. Though early forms of 
Rule 14a-8 did little to empower shareholders,316 today interested 
shareholders have gained significant power through the shareholder proposal 
tool.317 Indeed, despite the precatory (nonbinding) nature of these proposals, 
corporations have been forced to closely consider strongly supported 
proposals.318 This has become especially true in the face of the rise in the 
power of proxy advisers, such as ISS and Glass Lewis.319 If a corporate board 
chooses to ignore a strongly supported shareholder proposal, proxy advisory 
firms will exert their influence and express their dissatisfaction by 
recommending a vote against these boards in subsequent elections, therefore 
forcing the company to act upon the requested change.320 
 
 315 See supra note 155. 
 316 Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the 
Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1077–78 (2015). 
 317 See Rose, supra note 196, at 2192–2203; see Nili & Kastiel, supra note 156, at 73–74. 
 318 See Nili & Kastiel, supra note 156, at 76. 
 319 See Andrew Ramonas, Proxy Advisory Firm Registration Bill Passes House, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
20, 2017), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/proxy-advisory-firm-registration-bill-
passes-house?context=article-related [https://perma.cc/G9RK-4R7P]; Letter from Council of 
Institutional Investors to Jeb Hensarling, Chair, and Maxine Waters, Ranking Member, U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Fin. Servs. (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2017/Attachment%20to%20December
%2012,%202017%20Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SDY-5GAW] (“Proxy advisory firms, while 
imperfect, play an important and useful role in enabling effective and cost-efficient independent research, 
analysis and informed proxy voting advice for large institutional shareholders . . . .”); Letter from John 
Hayes, Chair, Corporate Governance Committee Business Roundtable, to Jeb Hensarling, Chair, and 
Maxine Waters, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Fin. Servs., 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/resources/business-roundtable-letter-support-h.r.-4015-corporate-
governance-reform-and-transparency [https://perma.cc/9YD3-AZQA] (“Given the enormous influence 
that proxy advisory firms wield over publicly held companies and the capital markets, it is critical that 
Congress take steps to improve their transparency and accountability.”). 
 320 See Nili & Kastiel, supra note 156, at 76 (arguing that this threat by proxy advisors “has 
transferred so called ‘precatory’ shareholder proposals into ‘quasi-binding’ resolutions”). 
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Indeed, otherwise passive shareholders have effectively expressed their 
voice by withholding votes from directors’ nominees.321 In an effort to avoid 
a withhold campaign, which could put directors’ board positions at risk and 
damage corporate reputation, many companies prefer to work with the 
proposing shareholder to avoid a shareholder vote.322 
In the context of horizontal directors, a focus on disclosure carries one 
additional benefit: disclosure is a more modest, voluntarily adopted request 
from the company, and one that falls within the core rights of shareholders. 
By merely requiring the company to provide meaningful past and current 
information on directors’ board positions, the company is not necessarily 
required to change anything other than providing an additional disclosure. 
However, the fact that shareholders may in fact benefit from the 
anticompetitive effect of horizontal directors may disincentivize many 
shareholders and large investors from initiating or supporting such 
resolutions. 
2. State Law 
State law can also evolve to better limit the concerns that arise from the 
increased prevalence of horizontal directors. As noted, fiduciary law may 
provide restrictions upon directors who serve on boards of two companies 
that operate in the same industry.323 In that respect, tightening judicial review 
of noncompete agreements, corporate opportunity waivers, and board 
fiduciary duties more generally may provide an evolving common law 
jurisprudence to address potential governance issues that stem from the 
presence of horizontal directors. 
For instance, Delaware courts could start scrutinizing horizontal 
directors for their independence when reviewing transactions that necessitate 
independent board approval324 and may deem directors who recuse 
 
 321 Id.; see generally Jill E. Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for 
Passive Investors (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 414/2018, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192069 [https://perma.cc/LA4Y-L9YS] (discussing the various ways through 
which institutional investors exert influence on companies). 
 322 Nili, Beyond the Numbers, supra note 63, at 198; see also JAMES R. COPLAND & MARGARET M. 
O’KEEFE, MANHATTAN INST., PROXY MONITOR 21 (2016), https://media4.manhattan-
institute.org/sites/default/files/pmr_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZH4-QN62] (discussing proposals that 
had “been negotiated off ballots by companies that adopted their own proxy-access rules”). 
 323 See supra Section I.D.2.  
 324 See, e.g., Edward B. Micheletti & Edward P. Welch, Delaware Supreme Court Rules on Director 
Independence, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 16, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/16/delaware-supreme-court-rules-on-director-independence/ 
[https://perma.cc/C38N-WU97]; Francis Pileggi, Chancery Reviews Fiduciary Duties of Independent 
Board of Directors, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2017), 
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themselves repeatedly due to conflicts of interest stemming from their 
service as horizontal directors as breaching their duty of care.325 Courts may 
also examine corporate opportunity waivers more skeptically where a 
horizontal director is involved and where the opportunity is given to a 
horizontal company. 
While this common law route will greatly depend on litigants voicing 
concerns regarding horizontal directors and on the sentiment that Delaware 
judges and legislators may form on the issue, it can provide the flexibility 
and adaptability that regulatory intervention often lacks.   
CONCLUSION 
In many ways, horizontal directors epitomize the push and pull of our 
corporate governance system. We depend upon directors to provide investors 
and companies with a myriad of functions. Directors are expected to monitor 
management, to provide expertise and networking, and to make the 
corporation’s most important decisions.326 Yet, we lean on outsiders to serve 
as directors, and we allow, and even encourage, their service on other boards. 
Indeed, many directors decide to serve on more than one board when given 
the opportunity. With a relatively limited time commitment to each board, 
significant salary and perks,327 and limited exposure to legal risk,328 being a 
director is a desired position. Accordingly, serving on several boards across 
industries, within the same industry, and even within the same SIC code can 
be beneficial not only to the director, but also to the companies she serves—
at least under certain conditions.329 
Yet, the question of the net value of horizontal directors and how 
horizontal directors should fit within our current antitrust regulatory 
framework and corporate governance regime remains unanswered. 
Similarly, it remains unclear how we should view horizontal directorships 
against the backdrop of increased industry concentration and vivid discourse 




 325 See WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, Board Positions and Competing Portfolio 
Companies 11 (July 2005), https://wsgr.com/PDFSearch/BoardPositionsandCompeting 
PortfolioCompanies.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE27-4FF8]. 
 326 See supra text accompanying notes 34–37. 
 327 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 328 See Bernard S. Black et al., Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis, 162 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 5, 5 (2006); Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer 
Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1175 (2006). 
 329 See supra Section III.B.  
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are especially pertinent given the overwhelming number of directors who 
serve on boards within the same industry or NAICS or SIC code.330 
This Article provides the first detailed empirical account of the 
prevalence of horizontal directors and how firms do or do not disclose their 
presence on boards. This evidence demonstrates why companies recruit 
horizontal directors, as well as the potential perils they may present. With 
the rise in importance of the board as an institution,331 and with the 
emergence of contemporary antitrust discourse regarding horizontal ties 
between companies through common shareholders, future research into 
horizontal directorships is still needed. Regulators and legislators should also 
reevaluate the current regulatory framework governing horizontal directors 
in light of these findings. Investors, too, should direct their attention to the 
issue of horizontal directorship. Understanding that not all companies are 
created equal, investors may be better situated than regulators to account for 
the rise in horizontal directorships and offer market-based solutions to the 
inherent tension that these directors present. 
  
 
 330 See supra Part II. 
 331 See supra Section I.A. 
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APPENDIX 

















Constant 0.32*** 0.06*** 0.61*** 0.16*** 0.69*** 0.21*** 0.73*** 0.43*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) 
2015 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.10 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) 
2014 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.13 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) 
2013 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.00 0.02 -0.10 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) 
2012 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05** -0.03** -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.07 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) 
2011 -0.03* -0.01 -0.07** -0.05*** -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.19** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) 
2010 -0.04** -0.02** -0.07** -0.05*** -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.19** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) 
Female -0.08*** -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.04 -0.08*** -0.11* -0.17*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) 
Age (Std) -0.00 -0.01* 0.02* -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.08*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Longest Tenure (Std) -0.01* 0.00* -0.02* -0.01* -0.01 -0.04*** 0.05** 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Chair (Current) -0.00 -0.01* 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
CEO (Current) 0.12*** -0.00 0.07** -0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.14 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) 
Comm. Chair (Current) 0.02* 0.00 0.00 -0.03*** 0.07** -0.01 0.07 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) 
Audit Expert -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03*** -0.04* -0.06*** 0.07* -0.09* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
Avg. Committees -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.03*** 0.00 -0.02* -0.02* -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
AIC 24895.63 -3738.58 11096.46 2948.11 2920.43 1751.87 555.97 650.46 
BIC 25021.57 -3612.63 11207.85 3059.52 3011.87 1843.35 626.06 720.54 
Log Likelihood -12431.8 1885.29 -5532.23 -1458 -1444.22 -859.93 -261.99 -309.23 
Deviance 4093.82 933.90 1886.38 664.15 476.14 282.87 83.96 98.54 
Num. obs. 19369 19377 7802 7808 2241 2248 590 590 
Logistic regressions predicting horizontal (y = 1) or not (y = 0). 
Coefficients are on the logit scale. Models are restricted to directors serving 
on exactly k boards. 
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Constant 0.35*** 0.07*** 0.66*** 0.17*** 0.81*** 0.22*** 0.91*** 0.42*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
2015 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
2014 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.07 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
2013 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
2012 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03* -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.12 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
2011 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04** -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.16* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
2010 -0.03* -0.01* -0.05* -0.04*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.15* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
Female -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.04 -0.09*** 0.01 -0.18*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Age (Std) -0.00 -0.01* 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03** -0.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Longest Tenure (Std) -0.01*** -0.00 -0.03*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.03** 0.04** 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Chair (Current) -0.00 -0.01* 0.03 -0.01 0.10*** 0.04 -0.03 0.08 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
CEO (Current) 0.13*** -0.00 0.05* -0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.10 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) 
Comm. Chair (Current) 0.03*** 0.01 0.03** -0.03*** 0.04* -0.03 0.05 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Audit Expert -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02* 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.08* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Avg. Committees -0.03*** -0.00 -0.03*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.06** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
AIC 26830.11 -555.25 10591.01 4126.56 2121.53 2042.35 121.33 726.57 
BIC 26956.30 -429.06 10702.58 4238.13 2213.18 2134.00 191.49 796.74 
Log Likelihood -13399.05 293.62 -5279.50 -2047.28 -1044.77 -1005.18 -44.66 -347.29 
Deviance 4497.70 1117.92 1761.35 776.12 333.68 322.25 40.36 112.01 
Num. obs. 19672 19672 7888 7888 2271 2271 593 593 
Logistic regressions predicting horizontal (y = 1) or not (y = 0). 
Coefficients are on the logit scale. Models are restricted to directors serving 
on exactly k boards 
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Constant 11.97*** 11.98*** 12.11*** 12.13*** 12.08*** 12.12*** 12.13*** 12.21*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) 
2015 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
2014 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
2013 -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
2012 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
2011 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
2010 -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.14* -0.14* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
Horizontal 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.04*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.10* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Tenure (Std) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02 0.03 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Num. Committee 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female -0.03** -0.03*** -0.03* -0.03** -0.03* -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
CEO Experience -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.06 -0.07 -0.69*** -0.70*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.13) 
Age (Std) 0.01 0.01 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log Mkt Cap (Std.) 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
AIC 40533.58 40595.02 20476.43 20533.94 7472.83 7502.44 2629.05 2639.63 
BIC 40653.93 40715.39 20588.81 20646.36 7569.93 7599.62 2707.69 2718.30 
Log Likelihood -20251.79 -20282.51 -10223.21 -10251.97 -3721.42 -3736.22 -1299.52 -1304.82 
Deviance 7957.35 7970.32 3628.86 3639.71 1327.19 1331.39 525.34 528.68 
Num. obs. 22548 22579 13258 13291 4785 4811 1398 1400 
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Constant 11.97*** 11.98*** 12.11*** 12.13*** 12.09*** 12.13*** 12.20*** 12.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) 
2015 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) 
2014 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
2013 -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
2012 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
2011 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.08 -0.07 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
2010 -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.15* -0.13 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
Horizontal 0.05*** 0.05** 0.04*** -0.00 0.05* 0.04 0.02 0.11* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) 
Tenure (Std) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Num. Committees 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03* -0.03** -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
CEO Experience -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.06 -0.06 -0.71*** -0.73*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.13) 
Age (Std) 0.01 0.01 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log Mkt Cap (Std.) 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
AIC 41117.07 41138.58 20930.77 20945.16 7752.65 7755.51 2707.65 2699.50 
BIC 41237.67 41259.18 21043.42 21057.81 7850.06 7852.92 2786.57 2778.42 
Log Likelihood -20543.54 -20554.29 -10450.38 -10457.58 -3861.33 -3862.76 -1338.83 -1334.75 
Deviance 8057.11 8064.67 3717.98 3721.94 1389.67 1390.48 546.60 543.48 
Num. obs. 22926 22926 13496 13496 4886 4886 1424 1424 
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Constant 4.21*** 4.21*** 4.23*** 4.22*** 3.92*** 3.88*** 3.23*** 3.41*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.15) 
2015 0.01 0.01 0.10* 0.10* 0.08 0.08 -0.14 -0.16 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16) 
2014 0.07* 0.07* 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) 
2013 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.15 -0.15 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) 
2012 -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.47** -0.48** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.15) 
2011 -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.14** -0.14** -0.10 -0.11 -0.36* -0.39* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.17) 
2010 -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.15** -0.15** -0.11 -0.12 -0.23 -0.25 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.18) 
Horizontal 0.02 0.13* -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.16 -0.10 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) 
Tenure (Std) -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Num. Committees -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.08* -0.09* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female 0.07** 0.07** 0.07* 0.06* 0.24*** 0.24*** -0.10 -0.15 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) 
CEO Experience -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.67*** -0.69*** -0.49* -0.49* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.22) (0.22) 
Age (Std) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Log Mkt Cap (Std.) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
AIC 60676.80 60752.98 33137.59 33207.95 11157.76 11223.44 3265.39 3269.37 
BIC 60793.90 60870.10 33246.00 33316.40 11250.31 11316.09 3339.11 3343.11 
Log Likelihood -30323.40 -30361.49 -16553.79 -16588.97 -5563.88 -5596.72 -1617.69 -1619.69 
Deviance 30018.93 30024.93 15430.05 15444.47 4828.53 4844.85 1465.20 1467.79 
Num. obs. 18153 18184 10173 10200 3532 3557 1007 1008 
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 SIC 5 boards 
Constant 4.20*** 4.20*** 4.21*** 4.21*** 3.93*** 3.90*** 3.54***  3.42*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.21)  (0.16) 
2015 0.01 0.01 0.10* 0.10* 0.08 0.08 -0.15  -0.15 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16)  (0.16) 
2014 0.07* 0.07* 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.06 0.06 0.07  0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.14)  (0.14) 
2013 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.14  -0.15 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14)  (0.14) 
2012 -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 -0.45**  -0.47** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)  (0.15) 
2011 -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.13** -0.13** -0.11 -0.12 -0.37*  -0.38* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16)  (0.16) 
2010 -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.14** -0.14** -0.11 -0.12 -0.24  -0.25 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18)  (0.18) 
Horizontal 0.03 0.13** -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.19** -0.18  -0.09 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.17)  (0.10) 
Tenure (Std) -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.17***  -0.17*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.04) 
Num. Committees -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*  -0.09* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.04) 
Female 0.07** 0.07** 0.07* 0.06* 0.22*** 0.21*** -0.13  -0.15 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)  (0.10) 
CEO Experience -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.69*** -0.67*** -0.43  -0.42 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.23)  (0.22) 
Age (Std) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.04  -0.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.05) 
Log Mkt Cap (Std.) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.04* 0.04 0.03  0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.04) 
AIC 61595.02 61587.05 33671.49 33667.27 11369.79 11361.18 3304.08  3304.26 
BIC 61712.36 61704.38 33780.13 33775.91 11462.61 11454.00 3377.96  3378.15 
Log Likelihood -30782.51 -30778.52 -16820.75 -16818.63 -5669.89 -5665.59 -1637.04  -1637.13 
Deviance 30422.60 30409.44 15699.60 15693.19 4927.30 4915.52 1486.09  1486.36 
Num. obs. 18441 18441 10331 10331 3597 3597 1018  1018 
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Constant -10.06*** -10.09*** -9.86*** -9.85*** -9.79*** -9.78*** -9.25*** -9.16*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.18) (0.16) (0.40) (0.36) 
2015 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.13 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.39) (0.39) 
2014 -0.04 -0.05 -0.19 -0.20* -0.06 -0.03 -0.29 -0.38 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.36) (0.36) 
2013 -0.07 -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 -0.13 -0.10 -0.38 -0.43 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.37) (0.37) 
2012 0.04 0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 -0.53 -0.60 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.36) (0.36) 
2011 0.14 0.15* 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.18 -0.35 -0.50 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.37) (0.37) 
2010 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.16 -0.23 -0.37 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.37) (0.37) 
Horizontal -0.07 0.08 -0.04 -0.15 -0.03 -0.15 -0.26 -0.78*** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.23) (0.23) 
Tenure (Std) -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.62*** -0.60*** -0.77*** -0.77*** -0.48*** -0.47*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) 
Num. Committees -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.36*** -0.38*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
Female 0.11 0.12* 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.46 0.39 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.26) (0.26) 
CEO Experience 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.20** 0.20* 0.34 0.31 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.19) (0.38) (0.39) 
Age (Std) -0.02 -0.02 -0.09** -0.10** -0.14** -0.15** 0.05 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) 
Log Mkt Cap 
(Std.) 0.77
*** 0.78*** 1.05*** 1.07*** 1.39*** 1.41*** 1.24*** 1.23*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) 
AIC 131638.93 131838.33 73312.37 73498.31 25419.29 25554.30 7375.23 7374.77 
BIC 131761.31 131960.73 73425.69 73611.67 25516.65 25651.74 7453.97 7453.53 
Log Likelihood -65804.47 -65904.17 -36641.19 -36734.16 -12694.64 
-
12762.15 -3672.62 -3672.39 
Deviance 247574.67 248150.74 148763.46 149264.95 52430.47 52704.38 15242.29 15146.36 
Num. obs. 25812 25846 14111 14144 4869 4895 1407 1409 
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Constant -10.04*** -10.07*** -9.80*** -9.85*** -9.83*** -9.82*** -9.41*** -9.39*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.20) (0.16) (0.49) (0.36) 
2015 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.23 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.39) (0.39) 
2014 -0.05 -0.05 -0.21* -0.21* -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 -0.19 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.36) (0.36) 
2013 -0.08 -0.08 -0.19 -0.19 -0.11 -0.11 -0.34 -0.35 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.37) (0.37) 
2012 0.03 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.00 -0.00 -0.52 -0.54 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.36) (0.36) 
2011 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.22 -0.33 -0.36 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.37) (0.37) 
2010 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 -0.24 -0.28 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.37) (0.37) 
Horizontal -0.10* -0.16* -0.10 -0.20* -0.00 -0.08 -0.11 -0.30 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.37) (0.21) 
Tenure (Std) -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.60*** -0.60*** -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.50*** -0.49*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) 
Num. Committees -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.36*** -0.37*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
Female 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 -0.06 -0.07 0.57* 0.52* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.26) (0.26) 
CEO Experience 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.20* 0.19* 0.29 0.29 0.03 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.19) (0.38) (0.38) 
Age (Std) -0.02 -0.02 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.17** -0.17** 0.09 0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) 
Log Mkt Cap 
(Std.) 0.77
*** 0.77*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 1.42*** 1.41*** 1.20*** 1.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) 
AIC 133703.10 133705.12 74587.63 74586.44 25943.01 25942.65 7517.86 7515.83 
BIC 133825.72 133827.73 74701.21 74700.01 26040.68 26040.31 7596.85 7594.82 
Log Likelihood -66836.55 -66837.56 -37278.82 -37278.22 -12956.51 
-
12956.32 -3743.93 -3742.92 
Deviance 251333.43 251352.78 151598.33 151585.72 53577.30 53573.33 15691.21 15669.01 
Num. obs. 26220 26220 14351 14351 4968 4968 1431 1431 
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